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"GMO:" Genetically Modified Organism
or Gigantic Monetary Obligation? The
Liability Schemes for GMO Damage in
the United States and the European
Union
A. BRYAN ENDRES*
As with many modern technological developments, the
enormous benefits of biotechnology will not come without
corresponding social and environmental risks. Although
scientists and policymakers have dismissed earlier predictions of
pandemics resulting from the release of genetically engineered
microorganisms, few maintain that they can predict with
certainty the ecological consequences of inserting a gene from
one species into another species and releasing the result of that
miscegenation into the environment. Past unpleasant
experiences with nuclear power, pesticides, and the importation
of exotic plant species caution against launching headlong into
the development and marketing of a new biotechnology without
examining its potential for environmental harm. It may be, as
many microbiologists predict, that very few modern
biotechnologies pose any risk to humans or the environment;
but, almost certainly', there will be one with the potential to
cause great damage.
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Bowie State University, European Division, Heidelberg, Germany (1995); J.D., European
Union Fellow, University of Illinois, Champaign (2000); law clerk to Chief Judge Haldane
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I. INTRODUCTION
A Cornell University study found that pollen from corn
genetically modified to produce the toxin Bacillus thuringiensis
(Bt) is fatal to monarch butterflies.2  Environmental groups
immediately thereafter filed a petition with the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) seeking protection for butterflies from
the Bt corn pollen.3 The potential impact on butterflies and other
species could be enormous because Bt varieties comprise thirty
percent of the U.S. corn crop, 4 which grows on approximately
twenty million acres.5 Considerable resistance to any EPA action
is expected from multi-national agra-business giants Novartis,
Monsanto, and Pioneer Hi-Bred, whose annual revenues from
genetically modified seeds have grown to over a billion dollars
each year.
6
Monsanto, however, continues to maintain the health and
environmental benefits of its Bt corn.7 Claiming the safety of
dangerous products, even when science indicates otherwise, is not
a new strategy for Monsanto. Three years after Congress
mandated a ban on polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs)8 (of which
Monsanto was the only commercial producer), the company
publicly stated that regulation was unnecessary because "PCBs,
2. See John E. Losey et al., Transgenic Pollen Harms Monarch Larvae, NATURE,
May 20, 1999, at 214; Genetic Engineering: No Obligation to Report Presence of GMOs If
Less than 1%, EUR. INFO. SERVICE (Brussels, Belg.), June 18, 1999, § 46, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Eiseng File.
3. See Karen L. Werner, Industry Research to Examine Effect of Bt Corn Pollen on
Butterflies in Field, 22 INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) 713, 714 (Sept. 1, 1999). The
Environmental Defense Fund petitioned the EPA to require the planting of buffer zones
around fields of Bt corn pending a full evaluation of potential risks to other lepidopteran
insects. See Environmental Defense Fund, Petition (visited July 21, 1999)
<http://www.edf.org/issues/Btcornpetition.html>.
4. See United States Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service,
Genetically Engineered Crops for Pest Management tbl.4 (visited Nov. 20, 1999)
<http://www.econ.ag.gov/whatsnew/issues/biotech>.
5. See Online News Hour with Jim Lehrer, High-Tech Crops (visited Aug. 12, 1999),
<http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/environment/July-dec99/seeds_8-12.html>.
6. See Scott Kilman, Once Quick Converts, Farmers Begin to Lose Faith in Biotech
Crops, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 1999, at Al.
7. See The Monsanto Company, Environmental Benefits of YieldGard® Corn (visited
Oct. 10, 1999)
<http://www.monsanto.com/ag/articles/YieldGardEnvironmentalBenefit.htm> (discussing
the results of the independent study commissioned by Monsanto and conducted by Richard
S. Fawcett, Ph.D.).
8. See Toxic Substance Control Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e) (1994).
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while not harmless, are not carcinogenic and do not have serious
long-term health effects." 9  Since that time, corporations using
Monsanto's PCBs have spent enormous sums in remediation
under the federal Superfund law. 10 Due to the widespread use of
genetically modified organisms (GMOs), 11 and the scientific
uncertainty of their long-term environmental and health effects,
corporate liability could approach Superfund levels in the event of
serious GMO damage.
In addition to possibly transferring herbicide-resistant genes
via the errant pollen to weeds, pollen from genetically modified
crops could cross-pollinate organic crops, thereby stripping
organic farmers of their organic status certifications and the
accompanying price premiums.12 Organic tortilla chip processor,
9. Sandra Sugawara, EPA Reopening Debate on Effects of PCB, WASH. POST, May
10, 1982, at A15 (noting that Monsanto was the only firm producing PCBs commercially
when Congress passed the 1976 ban and quoting Larry O'Neill, a spokesman for
Monsanto).
10. See Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act
(Superfund Act), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994) (mandating the cleanup of and
establishing liability for releasing hazardous substances); 26 U.S.C. § 9507(a) (1994)
(creating the "Hazardous Substance Superfund" trust fund). "One of the primary
purposes of the Superfund Act is to facilitate government cleanup of hazardous waste
discharge and impede future releases in order to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to
the public health, welfare, or to the environment, which may otherwise result from a
release or threat of a release." Charles H. Sarlo, A Comparative Analysis: The Affirmative
Defense of an Innocent Landowner Versus the Prima Facie Case of a Toxic Tort Plaintiff:
Can CERCLA'S Innocent Landowner Provision Be Used to Defend a Toxic Tort Suit?, 16
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 243, 246 (1999).
11. The most widely accepted definition of a "genetically modified organism" is "an
organism in which the genetic material has been altered in a way that does not occur
naturally by mating and/or natural recombination." Council Directive 90/220 of 23 April
1990 on the Deliberate Release into the Environment of Genetically Modified Organisms,
art. 2(2), 1990 O.J. (L 117) 15, 16 [hereinafter Directive 90/220]. The Directive defines an
"organism" as "any biological entity capable of replication or of transferring genetic
material." Id. art. 2(1). The two most common genetically modified agricultural products
include Bt corn (corn modified through genetic manipulation to produce the toxin Bacillus
thuringiensis) and Roundup Ready soybeans (soybeans genetically modified to be resistant
to the herbicide glyphosate, commonly known as Roundup). See generally Janet Carpenter
& Leonard Gianessi, Why U.S. Farmers Are Adopting Genetically Modified Crops, ECON.
PERSP. (U.S. Dep't of State, Office of Int'l Info. Programs) (Oct. 1999)
<http://www.usinfo.state.gov/journals/ites/1099/ijee/bio-gianessi2.htm> (providing statistics
on U.S. crop acreage planted to GM varieties-in 1998, Bt corn occupied 14.4 million
acres (18% of the U.S. total acreage) and Roundup Ready soybeans occupied 19 million
acres (26% of the U.S. total acreage)).
12. See John Innes Centre, Press Release, Gene Transfer from Genetically Modified
Crops (June 17, 1999) <http://www.jic.bbsrc.ac.uk/press/990617.htm>. The United
Kingdom's Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food (MAFF) commissioned the study;
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Terra Prima, recalled and destroyed 87,000 units of certified
organic tortilla chips from Europe after tests revealed the
presence of genetically modified corn.13 The company traced the
corn used to make the recalled chips back to the specific organic
farmer who grew the corn.14 The probable cause of the "positive"
test was pollen from genetically modified corn in nearby fields
cross-pollinating with the farmer's organically grown corn.15 A
recent study conducted in the United Kingdom identified pollen
from genetically modified crops that bees carried 4.5 kilometers
away from the test site. 16 The researchers also found airborne
genetically modified pollen up to 475 meters away from the test
crops. 1
7
Many consumers, especially in Europe, oppose genetically
modified food because they suspect the food will prove unhealthy
in the long run.18 Such fears are understandable given the recent
food scares involving Mad Cow Disease, bacterially contaminated
meat, and dioxin in poultry, pork, and beef products. 19 In each of
these cases, the affected country's government either suppressed
.'inconvenient' scientific data" or directly lied about the food's
safety.2
0
the Centre is an independent world-leading research center in plant and microbial
sciences. See No Scaleback of GMO Trials Despite Study Citing Lack of Cross-
Contamination Controls, 22 INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) 535, 535 (June 23, 1999). The study
"concluded that 'no system for the field production of seed can guarantee absolute genetic
purity of seed samples."' Id.
The premiums organic farmers receive vary according to the particular crop. As a
general proposition, "[t]he organic system with organic price premiums had the highest
profitability" of any of the farming systems studied over a four year period. Susanne
Vaupel, Advising Producers of Organic Crops, 2 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 137, 151 (1997). See
also generally Barry Kissoff, Emergence of U.S. Organic Agriculture- Can We Compete?, 5
AM. J. ARGIC. ECON. 1130, 1130-1133 (1998) (discussing the price premium for organic
products). Once a farmer's crops lose their organic status, the farmer must wait up to
three years to obtain re-certification. See Francesca Lyman, 'Transgenic' Pollution a New
Concern (visited Nov. 13, 1999) <http://www.msnbc.com/news/309357.asp>.
13. See Cheryl Hogue, Organic Farmers, Greenpeace, Others Ask Court to Pull Bt
Crop Registrations, 22 INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) 195, 196 (Mar. 3, 1999).
14. See id.
15. See id. See also Lyman, supra note 11.
16. See Friends of the Earth, Press Release, GM Crops: Genetic Pollution Proved, GM
Pollen Found Miles From Trial Site (Sept. 29, 1999)
<http://www.foe.co.uk/pubsinfo/infoteam/pressrel/1999/19990929223031.html>.
17. See id.
18. See Food for Thought, ECONOMIST, June 19, 1999, at 19, 20.
19. See id. at 20.
20. See id. The lack of trust in regulatory procedures and institutions is more
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In 1996, the New England Journal of Medicine published a
report identifying possible negative health effects of genetically
modified food.21 The report detailed agra-business giant Pioneer
Hi-Bred's efforts to increase amino acid levels in soybeans
through genetic modification. The modification transferred to the
soybean the same genetic material that occurs naturally in Brazil
nuts and causes allergic reactions in some people. 22 Food allergies
affect anywhere from two and one half to five million people in
the United States, with symptoms ranging from mild discomfort to
a severe and even fatal reaction known as anaphylactic shock.
23
Citing fears of potential allergic reactions and antibiotic resistance,
the British Medical Association called for a ban on the release of
GMOs into the environment.
24
A United Kingdom survey conducted in June 1999 found that
fifty-six percent of those surveyed thought genetically modified
foods were unsafe to eat.25  Sir Paul McCartney, a leading
advocate for GMO-free food, publicly criticized the U.K.
Government's support of GMO technology.26  Throughout
Europe, larger supermarket chains banned the use of GMOs as
ingredients in generic and brand-name labels.27  Prominent
significant in Europe than in the United States. See George Gaskell et al., Worlds Apart?
The Reception of Genetically Modified Foods in Europe and the U.S., 285 SCIENCE 384, 385
(1999). Only four percent of Europeans surveyed place their highest confidence in
national political bodies' being truthful about genetically modified crops. See id. U.S.
citizens, in contrast, expressed 90 and 84 percent confidence in the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA) or Food and Drug Administration (FDA) statements on the safety of
genetically modified crops. See id.
21. See Julie A. Nordlee et al., Identification of a Brazil-Nut Allergen in Transgenic
Soybeans, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 688, 688 (1996).
22. See id. at 691.
23. See Environmental Defense Fund, Gene Altered Food Triggers Allergy (visited
Aug. 23,1999) <http://www.edf.org/pubs/edf%2Dletter/1996/may/h%5Fbiotec.html>.
24. See Maxine Frith & Eileen Murphy, BMA Calls for Ban on GM Crops and Food,
PRESS ASs'N NEWSFILE, May 17, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
25. See John Willman, Consumer Power Forces the Food Industry to Modify its
Approach, FIN. TIMES (London), June 9, 1999, at 10.
26. See Vivienne Aitken, Blair Wrong on GM Food, Says Paul, DAILY REC.
(Glasgow, Scot.), June 11, 1999, at 29.
27. See Lawrence J. Speer, Supermarket Coalition to Ban GMOs, 22 INT'L ENV'T REP.
(BNA) 272, 272 (Mar. 31, 1999); see also Genetic Engineering: Major Companies Reject
GM-Food, EUR. INFO. SERVICE (Brussels, Belg.), June 4, 1999, § 45, available in LEXIS,
News File, Eiseng File (stating that "[t]o date the four main supermarket chains in the
United Kingdom (Tesco, Sainsbury's, Asda, and Safeways) have stopped selling GMO-
containing products."); Steve Strecklow, 'Genetically Modified' On the Label Means...
Well, It's Hard to Say, WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 1999, at Al (describing the reaction of
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European food producers Nestle and Unilever quickly adopted a
GMO-free policy.28  Grupo Maseca, Mexico's largest tortilla
producer, announced it would no longer purchase genetically
modified corn, thereby possibly impacting the $500 million annual
U.S. corn export to Mexico. 29 In the United States, Heinz and
Gerber, the two largest baby food manufacturers, also announced
a GMO-free policy.30 Gerber's announcement was especially
troubling to U.S. farmers because Gerber's parent company,
Novartis, is a leader in the biotechnology industry and was the first
company to sell genetically modified corn seed. 31 Due to market
uncertainties and the potential for "massive liability from damage
caused by genetic drift [or cross-pollination], '32 over thirty farm
groups, including the American Corn Growers Association and
the National Family Farm Coalition, warned farmers about the
dangers of planting genetically engineered crops.33 Furthermore,
Deutsche Bank, a large German bank, withdrew its previously
positive projections and issued a report warning investors to
"steer clear of companies associated with GMO crops." 34
On January 21, 1999, in response to growing public
skepticism in Europe over possible GMO externalities, the
European Parliament's Committee on the Environment, Public
Health, and Consumer Protection adopted a proposal advocating
a "safety first" principle. 35 The report addresses the European
Commission proposal to amend Directive 90/220, the current law
supermarkets in the United Kingdom to the growing skepticism of GMOs).
28. See Genetic Engineering: Major Companies Reject GM-Food, supra note 27.
29. See Joanna Blythman, The Seeds of Doubt, SUNDAY HERALD (Glasgow, Scot.),
Sept. 19, 1999, at 9.
30. See id.
31. See NCGA Takes Exception to Novartis/Gerber Actions on GMOs, SCI. POL'Y
REP. (Aces News, Univ. Ill., Urbana Champaign), Sept. 14, 1999 (on file with the Loyola
of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law Review).
32. William Claiborne, Biotech Crops Spur Warning, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 1999, at
Al.
33. See id. See also Corn Growers Call on Farmers to Consider Alternative to Planting
GMOs If Questions are Not Answered, PR NEWSWIRE (New York, N.Y.), Aug. 25, 1999,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Prnews File..
34. Sean Poulter, GM Industry Faces Collapse, Says Bank, DAILY MAIL (London),
Aug. 24, 1999, at 6.
35. See Legislative Resolution Embodying Parliament's Opinion on the Proposal for a
European Parliament and Council Directive Amending Directive 90/220/EEC on the
Deliberate Release into the Environment of Genetically Modified Organisms, 1999 O.J.
(C 139) 363 [hereinafter Parliament Resolution].
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regulating the deliberate release of GMOs into the environment.36
The Committee adopted an amendment imposing civil and
criminal liability for any damage to human health or the
environment resulting from the deliberate release of GMOs. 37 In
addition, the Committee recommended a more general
environmental liability directive for passage at a future date
governing the entire European Union.
38
In contrast to the European Union's pro-active approach to
GMO regulation and liability issues, no single federal statute in
the United States regulates GMOs directly. 39 The EPA, Food and
Drug Administration (FDA), and U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA) share minimal and inadequate supervisory
responsibilities to regulate only the plant health and pesticide
aspects of GMOs, while other characteristics of GMOs remain
unregulated.40 Therefore, recovering damages for injury resulting
from the release of GMOs into the environment, such as allergic
reactions, cross-pollination of conventional or organic crops, or
harm to natural resources, like the Monarch butterfly, must
proceed under the common law's difficult burden of proof.
The United States leads the world in the development of
genetically modified organisms.41  A U.S. State Department
official testified before the Senate Finance Subcommittee on
International Trade that "[w]ithin a few years, virtually one
hundred percent of U.S. agricultural commodity exports will be
36. See Commission Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive
Amending Directive 90/220/EEC on the Deliberate Release into the Environment of
Genetically Modified Organisms, 1998 O.J. (C 139) 1 [hereinafter Commission Proposal].
37. See Parliament Resolution art. 22(a)(a), supra note 35.
38. See id. recital 17(a).
39. See John H. Barton, Biotechnology, the Environment, and International
Agricultural Trade, 9 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 95, 108 (1996) (stating that in 1984, the
EPA and USDA decided to issue new regulations under a variety of existing laws instead
of lobbying for a new comprehensive law dealing with the various biotechnology-related
issues).
40. See William Allen, The Current Federal Regulatory Framework for Release of
Genetically Altered Organisms into the Environment, 42 FLA. L. REV. 531, 550 (1990).
41. See id. In the year 2000, more than sixty million hectares will be cultivated using
GMOs. See Rapid Growth in GMO Plantings, AGRA EUR. (London), Nov. 27, 1998, at
M/5, available in LEXIS News Library, Asapii File. More than eighty percent of the
plantings will be in North America, ten percent in Asia, eight percent in South America,
and only one percent in Europe. See id. A "hectare" is "a metric unit of area equal to ...
10,000 square meters." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1048
(1986).
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genetically modified or mixed with GMO products." 42 In contrast,
the European Union, which is a major market for U.S. agricultural
products, has a "slow and unpredictable process for approving
new U.S. agricultural products developed through advanced
biotechnology." 43  According to Foreign Agricultural Service
Administrator Tim Galvin, who testified before the House
Agriculture Subcommittee on Risk Management and Specialty
Crops, the United States is "shut out of the E.U. market because
of commingling [traditionally grown crops with varieties
containing GMOs]. ' 44 E.U. restrictions on genetically modified
corn cost U.S. farmers $200 million in sales in 1998.4 5 Meanwhile,
the U.S. trade deficit with the European Union continues to rise.
46
European Union officials claim that the arduous E.U.
approval process is based on consumer distrust.47 According to
Congressman Thomas W. Ewing (Rep-Ill.), Chairperson of the
House Agricultural Subcommittee on Risk Management and
Specialty Crops, the Europeans are "dumb like [foxes]" because
they "us[e] this [GMO] issue to keep [U.S. products] out."'48 U.S.
42. Chad Bowman, European Union: USTR Working on Draft Retaliation List in
Hormone-Raised Beef Spat with E.U., INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA), Mar. 16, 1999,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Bnaitd File.
43. Prepared Statement of Ambassador David L. Aaron, Under Secretary of
Commerce for International Trade Before the Subcommittee on Trade of the House
Committee on Ways and Means, July 28, 1998, available in 1998 WL 12762839 [hereinafter
Aaron Statement]. In the United States, Canada, and Japan, nearly 100 products
containing GMOs are allowed "general release" while the European Union has approved
only fourteen. See Philip Clarke, Europe Takes Hard Line on Genetically Modified Crop
Approvals, FARMER'S WKLY. (Sutton, Surrey, U.K.), Dec. 11, 1998, at 58. Gaining E.U.
GMO approval takes much longer than in other states. For example, Novartis' Bt-maize
took six months to gain approval in the United States, ten months in Canada and Japan,
and over two years in the European Union. See id.
44. Jennifer Coderre, Biotechnology: Agriculture Officials Urge Outreach to Convince
Europe of GMOs' Benefits, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA), Mar. 5, 1999, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Bnaitd File.
45. Stuart E. Eizenstat, Under Secretary of Commerce, The Future of Our Economic
Partnership with Europe, Before the House International Relations Committee, FED. NEWS
SERVICE (Washington, D.C.), June 15, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library, Fednew
File.
46. See Aaron Statement, supra note 43.
47. See Daniel Pruzin, Labeling: United States Reiterates Complaint to WTO on E. U.
Labeling of Genetically Modified Foods, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA), Sept. 17, 1998,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Bnaitd File.
48. Coderre, supra note 44, at 2. The rise of international trade arrangements like the
WTO, forces nations to use different approaches, such as labeling and strict product
"safety" requirements, as opposed to tariffs, to prevent entry of foreign agricultural
products. See Barton, supra note 39, at 95.
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farmers already feel the effects of the European Union's
resistance to approve imports of GMOs. Two large U.S. food
processors, Archer Daniels Midland Company and A.E. Staley
Manufacturing Company, announced they intend to reject "any
genetically modified corn that is not accepted in European
markets." 49  In addition, the European Union rejected several
applications for GMO crops, despite the E.U. Scientific
Committee on Plants' approval.50  In response to growing
pressure from the agra-business sector, the United States recently
voiced concerns to the World Trade Organization (WTO) over
E.U. labeling requirements for genetically modified foods51 and
the E.U. approval process for GMO imports.
52
Although seemingly unrelated, the European Parliament's
staunch position on GMO liability plays a major role in the multi-
million dollar E.U.-U.S. trade in agricultural products. 53 The
current E.U. GMO approval process severely restricts U.S. corn
and soybean exports to the European Union.54 A de facto ban on
new GMO approvals is likely to continue until the European
Council and Parliament revise the Directive regulating GMOs
(Directive 90/220).55 Parliament insists that any revision to the
Directive must include a comprehensive liability scheme for the
companies selling GMO products - a position the Council refuses
to consider.56
In addition to the controversy surrounding application of
Directive 90/220, the European Union recently revised Directive
85/374 (Products Liability Directive) to include primary
agricultural products within the products liability scheme.
57
49. ADM, Staley to Reject Some Genetically Modified Corn, NEWS-GAZETtE
(Champaign, I11.), Apr. 15, 1999, at C8.
50. See European Union: E.U. States Reject GMO Cotton Seeds, Despite Green Light
from Science Panel, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA), Feb. 16, 1999, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Bnaitd File.
51. See Pruzin, supra note 47.
52. See U.S. Considers Filing Complaint with WTO over E.U. Barriers to GMO
Imports, Aide Says, 22 INT'L ENV'T REP. 569, 569 (July 7, 1999).
53. Parliament favors imposing strict liability for damage caused by the release of
GMOs into the environment; for a detailed discussion of Parliament's standpoint on this
issue, see infra notes 354-361.
54. See Aaron Statement, supra note 43.
55. See Joe Kirwin, EU Environment Ministers Strengthen De Facto Ban on GMOs;
WTO Fight Looms, 22 INT'LENV'T REP. 567,567-568 (July 7,1999).
56. See id.
57. See Council Directive 99/34 of the European Parliament and the Council of 10
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Presently, the European Parliament impatiently awaits the long-
expected Commission proposal for a directive imposing civil
liability for environmental damage. The Commission issued a
"Green Paper" in May 1993,58 promised a final version of the
legislation in 1996, but delayed until 2000 to issue a "White Paper"
recommending further consultations. 59 The civil liability directive
will reportedly address GMO liability as well as other potential
causes of environmental damage. 60 Until the E.U. institutions
agree on a common GMO liability scheme, E.U.-U.S. trade in
virtually all agricultural products will be severely impaired.
As background to the current controversy, Part II of this
Article summarizes the legal background of environmental
protection in the European Union and its relation to the common
market. Part III explores the current E.U. GMO regulatory and
liability schemes, specifically those in the United Kingdom,
Austria, and Germany. Part IV outlines the U.S. regulatory
scheme and analyzes liability for GMO damage under established
common law doctrines. Part V examines the approach various
international conventions employ to address GMO regulation and
liability. Part VI discusses three proposals to modify or create
E.U. directives imposing liability for environmental damage
resulting from GMOs. Finally, Part VII presents
recommendations and predictions for the future scope of
environmental liability in the European Union.
May 1999 Amending Council Directive 85/374/EEC on the Approximation of the Laws,
Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning Liability for
Defective Products art. 2, May 10, 1999, O.J. (L 141) 20 (1999) (amending the Products
Liability Directive to remove previous exclusions of "primary agricultural products" from
liability by deleting Article 15(1)(a)) [hereinafter Directive 99/34].
58. See Communication from the Commission to the Council and Parliament and the
Economic and Social Committee: Green Paper on Remedying Environmental Damage,
May 14, 1993, COM(93)47 final at 4; Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on
the Communication from the Commission to the Council and Parliament and the
Economic and Social Committee: Green Paper on Remedying Environmental Damage,
Feb, 23, 1994, 1994 O.J. (C 133) 8 [hereinafter Civil Liability Green Paper].
59. See Environmental Liability: Commission Still Cagey About Liability for Damage,
EUR. INFO. SERVICE (Brussels, Belg.), Jan. 23, 1996, § 469, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Eiseng File [hereinafter Environmental Liability]; European Commission White
Paper on Environmental Liability, COM(2000) 66 final at 4 [hereinafter White Paper].
60. See Environmental Liability, supra note 59.
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND TO THE EUROPEAN UNION'S
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND MARKET HARMONIZATION
LEGISLATION
The 1957 Treaty of Rome 61 established the European
Economic Community, but did not mention environmental
protection. 62 During the 1972 Paris Summit, the Community
formally stated a need to pay particular attention to
environmental protection and improve the general quality of
life. 63 Finally, the 1987 Single European Act (SEA) 64 granted
environmental protection explicit status within the treaty
document.
65
Prior to the SEA, two treaty provisions served as the basis for
environmental legislation.66 Article 100 of the original Treaty of
Rome authorized Community-level legislation to harmonize the
laws among the Member States.67 Article 235 granted the Council
authority to enact measures necessary to achieve any objective of
the common market in which the Treaty failed to explicitly
provide the required power. 68 Both Articles grant broad powers
to the Community, practicably limited only by political will.
The Treaty article authorizing the legislation determines
whether the legislation will take the form of a "directive" or
"regulation" and establishes the specific parliamentary process for
approval.69 Legislation based on both Article 100 and Article 235
61. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 11 (1958) [hereinafter EEC TREATY].
62. See STANLEY P. JOHNSON & Guy CORCELLE, THE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 1 (1989); James E. Pfander, Environmental Federalism in
Europe and the United States: A Comparative Assessment of Regulation Through the
Agency Member States, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY WITH POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION: THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES 62 (John B. Braden et
al. eds., 1996).
63. See JOHNSON & CORCELLE, supra note 62, at 1-2.
64. SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1 [hereinafter SEA].
65. See Margaret Rosso Grossman, Agro-Environmental Measures in the Common
Agricultural Policy, 25 U. MEMPHIS L. REV. 929, 941-942 (1995).
66. See EEC TREATY arts. 100, 235.
67. See id. art. 100.
68. See Grossman, supra note 65, at 939-940; IAN B. BIRD & MIGUEL A. VEIGA-
PESTANA, European Community Environmental Policy and Law, in EUROPEAN UNION
LAW AFTER MAASTRICHT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR LAWYERS OUTSIDE THE COMMON
MARKET 209, 223 & n.64 (describing use of Article 235 to protect the environment and
European Court cases supporting this interpretation of the Treaty).
69. See, e.g., EEC TREATY art. 100.
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requires unanimous action within the Council.70 While Article 100
legislation is limited to directives, Article 235 applies to both
regulations and directives. 71  Directives have been the most
popular type of Community legislation because of the flexibility
they offer Member States during implementation.
72
The SEA added three articles to the Treaty relating to
environmental protection. Article 130r establishes the general
objectives and principles for Community environmental policy.
73
Article 130s dictates the legislative process for community
environmental legislation.74 Although the SEA's purpose was to
introduce procedural changes to facilitate Community decision-
making and reduce the democratic deficit, Article 130s requires
unanimity for environmental legislation and provides Parliament
with only an advisory opinion role.75 Finally, Article 130t allows
Member States to maintain more stringent protective measures.
76
The SEA also added Article 100a, which directs Member
States to harmonize legislation impacting the environment and
include significant environmental protection.77 Article 100a also
introduced qualified majority voting to the Council78 and a
70. See id. arts. 100, 235.
71. See Grossman, supra note 65, at 940.
72. See id. at 936.
73. TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION art. 130r.
74. See id. art. 130s.
75. See id. See also Grossman, supra note 65, at 943; CLIVE ARCHER & FIONA
BUTLER, THE EUROPEAN UNION STRUCTURE & PROCESS 53-57 (2d ed. 1996)
(describing the consultation, cooperation, and co-decision procedures of adopting
legisla'tion).
76. See JOHNSON & CORCELLE, supra note 62, at 343-344.
77. See Grossman, supra note 65, at 942; SEA art. 100a(3) (stating that the
"Commission, in its proposals ... concerning health, safety, environmental protection and
consumer protection, will take as a base a high level of protection.").
78. Member States' votes in the Council roughly correlate to population. There are a
total of 87 votes in the Council, with 62 required for a qualified majority. See TREATY OF
AMSTERDAM AMENDING THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, THE TREATIES
ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND CERTAIN RELATED ACTS art. 148 (as
in effect 1997) (now article 205), 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1, 173 [hereinafter TREATY OF
AMSTERDAM]. Under qualified majority voting, the "Big Four" Member States of
Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom do not have enough votes to overrule the
unified objections of the smaller states. The votes of the Member States are weighted as
follows: Belgium (5), Denmark (3), Germany (10), Greece (5), Spain (8), France (10),
Ireland (3), Italy (10), Luxembourg (2), Netherlands (5), Austria (4), Portugal (5), Finland
(3), Sweden (4), and United Kingdom (10). See id.
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cooperation procedure with Parliament,79 providing them more
power to amend or reject proposals.
80
The 1992 Treaty on European Union (TEU)81 elevated the
importance of environmental protection by placing it "on a par
with economic issues." 82 A revised Article 130r established the
Precautionary Principle83 as well as the Polluter Pays Principle.
84
Although Directive 90/220 predates TEU's official inclusion of the
Precautionary Principle, the stringent approval process for GMOs
the Directive outlined follows precautionary principles. The much
older and more established Polluter Pays Principle,85 however,
was omitted from the Directive. Parliament's current efforts to
establish liability for GMO accidents fall in line with the Polluter
Pays Principle.
79. See Ralph H. Folsom, The European Union Law-Making Machine, in EUROPEAN
UNION LAW AFTER MAASTRICHT A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR LAWYERS OUTSIDE THE
COMMON MARKET 3, 7-8 (Ralph H. Folsom et al. eds., 1996). Under the cooperation
procedure, Parliament can reject or offer amendments to the Council's position on the
Commission's legislative proposal. See id. at 7. If Parliament rejects the Council's
position, the Council can adopt the legislation only by unanimous vote. See id.
Amendments Parliament offers are forwarded to the Commission for consideration. See
id. at 8. If the Commission adopts the new proposal, it is sent to the Council for adoption
by a qualified majority. If the Commission rejects Parliament's amendments, the Council,
acting by a qualified majority, may pass the legislation as the Commission proposed. See
id. The Council may adopt Parliament's amendments over the Commission's objection
only with unanimity. See id.
80. See Grossman, supra note 65, at 943; Folsom, supra note 79, at 7.
81. TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, Feb. 7,1992, O.J. (C 191) 1 (1992).
82. Grossman, supra note 65, at 945. The TEU added to Article 2 the Community's
task of "sustainable and non-inflationary growth respecting the environment." TREATY
ON EUROPEAN UNION art. 2. In addition, the treaty added to the official "activities of the
Community" a "policy in the sphere of the environment." See id. art. 3(k).
83. The "Precautionary Principle" means that "where there is a risk of significant
damage to human health or the environment[,] lack of scientific certainty should not be
used as a reason for not taking or for postponing measures to avoid or minimi[z]e such a
risk." Genetically Modified Food and Producer Liability Bill, 1999, § 1(4) (Eng.)
(presented to the House of Commons on June 24, 1999) <http://www.parliament.the-
stationery-office.co.uk/cgi-bin/empower> [hereinafter Simpson Bill].
84. See Grossman, supra note 65, at 948. "Community policy on the environment...
shall be based on the precautionary principle and ...that the polluter should pay."
TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION art. 130r(2).
85. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development: Council
Recommendation on the Implementation of the Polluter-Pays Principle, Nov. 14, 1974, 11
I.L.M. 234 (1975) (outlining the definition and guiding principles of the Polluter Pays
Principle). See also generally Sanford E. Gaines, The Polluter-Pays Principle: From
Economic Equity to Environmental Ethos, 26 TEX. INT'L L.J. 463, 467-481 (1991)
(discussing the evolution of the Polluter Pays Principle).
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The TEU significantly revised the legislative process for
environmental proposals. For most environmental measures
enacted under Article 130s(1), Parliament possesses cooperation
powers and the Council must act by a qualified majority.8 6 For
harmonization legislation under Article 100a, the Treaty requires
a qualified majority of the Council and compliance with a co-
decision procedure in Parliament, which provides Parliament with
power to veto legislation.
87
The 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam further revised the legislative
process for environmental protection.88 Environmental measures
enacted under Article 175(1) (formerly Article 130s(1))89 now
follow the co-decision procedures,90 elevating Parliament's role in
environmental matters to that of Article 95 (formerly Article
100a) 91 legislation on harmonization.
92
Under the authority that the now-amended Article 100a
established, the Council passed Directive 90/220 on April 23,
1990;93 although the Council could have instead passed the
Directive under the Article 130s authority as a general
environmental protective measure. 94 Under Article 100a, the
Council only needs a qualified majority.95 Since the ratification of
the TEU and Amsterdam Treaties, amendments to the Directive
are subject to the more extensive co-decision procedure in
Parliament. Parliament is therefore allowed two readings and the
opportunity to propose amendments. Furthermore, Parliament
86. See Grossman, supra note 65, at 950-951.
87. See TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION art. 189b.
88. TREATY OF AMSTERDAM pmbl.
89. The Treaty of Amsterdam renumbered TEU Article 130s(1) as Article 175(1).
See id. art. 175(1).
90. See id. The Treaty provides for the co-decision procedure in Article 251 (formerly
Article 189b). See id. art. 251.
91. The Treaty of Amsterdam renumbered TEU Article 100a as Article 95. See id.
art. 95.
92. Compare id. art. 175(1) (environmental protection measures will follow Article
251 co-decision procedures) and id. art. 95 (harmonization measures will follow Article
251 co-decision procedures) with TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION art. 100a (harmonization
measures will follow Article 189b co-decision procedures) and TREATY ON EUROPEAN
UNION art. 130s(1) (environmental protection measures will follow Article 189c
cooperation procedures).
93. See Directive 90/220, supra note 11, at 15.
94. See TREATY OF AMSTERDAM art. 130s (as in affect 1997) (now article 175).
95. See id. art. 100a (as in effect 1997) (now article 95) (referring to the procedures in
art. 189b (as in effect 1997) (now article 251)).
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also possesses veto power over any attempt by the Council to
revise Directive 90/220.96
III. THE E.U. GMO REGULATORY AND LIABILITY SCHEMES
Directive 90/220 was the final step in the lengthy building
process that the European Union used to establish the necessary
consensus for harmonizing its GMO regulatory regimes.97
Biotechnology companies had demanded E.U. legislation,98
arguing that the mosaic of regulatory regimes encountered at the
Member State level disadvantaged them with respect to United
States and Japanese competitors. 99
The "watchdog" 100 type government agency review the
United Kingdom and France employed exemplified this problem
by allowing GMO experimentation yet subjecting each project to
government agency approval and assessment processes. 10 1
Denmark and Germany took the opposite approach to GMOs.
The Danish Parliament prohibited all GMO experiments for
which the Minister of the Environment had not granted explicit
permission. 10 2 Similarly, Germany's Parliament proposed a five-
year moratorium on the deliberate release of GMOs. 10 3 The other
Member States did not directly regulate GMOs. 104  The
biotechnology industry, however, was willing to accept a more
rigorous risk-assessment technique to gain public support and
insulate itself from the Green Party.10 5 The German Government,
96. See TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION art. 189b.
97. See Michael Baiter, How Europe Regulates Its Genes, 252 SCIENCE 1366, 1367
(1991). Directive 90/220 required Member States to implement the Directive through
national legislation by October 1991. See Directive 90/220 art. 23(1), supra note 11, at 21.
98. See Balter, supra note 97, at 1368 (quoting then Director General of the E.C.
Environmental Directorate Laurens Jan Brinkhorst: "[i]ndustry often prefers not to be
regulated .... [b]ut the most important thing is to have predictability, and a standardized
process.").
99. See id. at 1367; see also David Dickson, Europe Splits Over Gene Regulation, 238
SCIENCE 18, 18 (1987).
100. Dickson, supra note 99, at 18 (quoting Bryan Ager, Secretary of the U.K.
Advisory Committee on Genetic Manipulation).
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id. Clara Frontali, of the Instituto Superior di SanitA in Rome, declared that in
Italy, there is "no legislation covering environmental release [of GMOs], and in theory,
one is free to take any potentially dangerous organism and spread it around in any amount
one wishes." Id.
105. See Baiter, supra note 97, at 1368 (explaining the extent of the Green Party's
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meanwhile, saw an opportunity to evade public debate over
having lifting its moratorium on GMO release. 10 6 The United
Kingdom and France envisioned no real change in their respective
procedures other than possibly increased paperwork. 10 7  The
remaining Member States generally approved the notion of the
E.U. legislation as a comforting measure designed to calm the
public.1
08
A. Approval Procedure in the Eurpoean Union
Directive 90/220 harmonized the approval process for placing
GMOs on the market and subsequently deliberately releasing
them into the environment.10 9 Prior to releasing a GMO, a
manufacturer or importer must notify the competent authority of
the Member State in which the release is to occur.110 Notification
must include, among other things, a technical dossier and a
detailed risk assessment.111 Within ninety days, the Member State
must either (1) forward the dossier to the Commission with a
favorable approval or (2) inform the notifier that the proposal is
rejected because it does not meet the Directive's requirements. 112
If the Member State's opinion is favorable, the Commission must
immediately forward the application to all Member States for
review and comment. 113 If no other Member State objects within
sixty days, the notifying Member State shall consent to placing the
product on the market.114 To date, however, at least one Member
State objects to every GMO consent application.
influence and its desire to eliminate the biotechnology industry as a whole).
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See Dickson, supra note 99, at 19.
109. The "deliberate release" is "any intentional introduction into the environment of
a GMO without provisions for containment" such as physical, chemical and/or biological
barriers to limit contact with the general population or the environment. Directive 90/220
art. 2(3), supra note 11, at 16. The act of placing the GMO product on the market falls
under "deliberate release" regulations. See id. art. 2(5). The Directive defines "placing
on the market" as "supplying or making available to a third party." Id.
110. See id. art. 11(1), supra note 11, at 18.
111. See id. annex II, at 23 (detailing the information required in the notification to the
Member State for placing a GMO on the market).
112. See id. art. 12(2)(a)-(b), at 19.
113. See id. art. 13(1), at 19.
114. See id. art. 13(2), at 19.
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A Member State's objection triggers a complex dispute
resolution process under Article 21 of the Directive.11 5 The
Commission submits a draft of the Member State's proposed
consent to a committee composed of representatives from all the
Member States.11 6  A qualified majority of the committee
members then issue an opinion.11 7 If the committee's report
supports granting consent for release, the Member State that
received the original notification shall give its consent in
writing.11 8 If the committee's report opposes the release, or the
committee cannot reach a qualified majority, the proposal for
consent is sent to the Council for a vote by a qualified majority.11 9
If a qualified majority of the Council does not vote in favor of or
vote to reject the consent within three months, the Commission
will approve the proposed consent and notify the Member State to
consent to the release.
120
Once a Member State consents to placing a GMO on the
market, the GMO product may be used, without further
notification, throughout the Community.121 As an exception to
E.U.-wide consent, a Member State may later provisionally
restrict a GMO's deliberate release if it has "justifiable reasons to
consider that a product ... constitutes a risk to human health or
the environment. '122 If such a risk arises, the Member State must
then notify the Commission, which then takes action in
accordance with the above procedures for pre-consent Member
State objections.
123
Since 1990, the Commission issued only fourteen approvals
placing GMOs on the market.124 By comparison, in the United
115. See id. art. 13(3), at 19 (mandating that if a compromise position cannot be
reached within the sixty-day notification period, the Commission will make the decision in
accordance with Article 21 of the Directive).
116. See id. art. 21, at 21.
117. See id. The qualified majority required for adopting a position consists of the
Member States' weighted votes established in Article 148(2) of the Treaty. See TREATY
ON EUROPEAN UNION art. 148(2).
118. See Directive 90/220 art. 13(4), supra note 11, at 20.
119. See id. art. 21, at 21.
120. See id.
121. See id. art. 13(5), at 20. The use must comply with the "specific conditions of use
and the environments and/or geographical areas stipulated" to in the written consent. Id.
122. Id. art. 16, at 20.
123. See id.
124. See, e.g., Commission Decision 93/572, 1993 O.J. (L 276) 16 (anti-rabies vaccine
for foxes); Commission Decision 94/385, 1994 O.J. (L 176) 23 (herbicide resistant
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States, Japan, and Canada, nearly one hundred genetically
modified products are allowed "general release." 125 In June 1999,
the Member States agreed to implement a de facto ban on future
approval of GMO consents. 126 The ban is expected to continue
until Parliament and the Council revise Directive 90/220 127-final
approval of which is not expected until 2001.128
B. E. U. Member State Implementation of Directive 90/220
1. The United Kingdom
Prior to the European Union's passage of Directive 90/220,
GMO regulations in the United Kingdom provided relatively
minimal government supervision for most biotechnology
activities. 129 Public support for GMOs in the United Kingdom
was favorable, with some studies publishing approval rates above
seventy-five percent. 130 Lingering skepticism over the safety of
the food supply and environmental groups' massive public
education efforts, however, changed consumer attitudes about
GMOs. 131 As of June 1999, twenty-four of the United Kingdom's
tobacco); Commission Decision 94/505, 1994 O.J. (L 203) 22 (vaccine Nobi-Provac
Aujeszky); Commission Decision 96/158, 1996 O.J. (L 37) 30 (herbicide tolerant swede-
rape); Commission Decision 96/281, 1996 O.J. (L 107) 10 (herbicide tolerant soya beans);
Commission Decision 96/424, 1996 O.J. (L 175) 25 (herbicide tolerant chicory);
Commission Decision 97/98, 1997 O.J. (L 31) 69 (modified maize with insecticidal
properties and herbicide tolerance); Commission Decision 97/392, 1997 O.J. (L 164) 38
(genetically modified swede-rape); Commission Decision 97/393, 1997 O.J. (L 164) 40
(genetically modified swede-rape); Commission Decision 97/549, 1997 O.J. (L 225) 34
(Streptococcus test); Commission Decision 98/291, 1998 O.. (L 131) 26 (genetically
modified spring swede-rape); Commission Decision 98/292, 1998 O.J. (L 131) 28
(genetically modified maize); Commission Decision 98/293, 1998 O.J. (L 131) 30
(genetically modified maize); Commission Decision 98/294, 1998 O.J. (L 131) 32
(genetically modified maize).
125. See Clarke, supra note 43, at 58.
126. See Kirwin, supra note 55, at 567.
127. See id. at 568.
128. See id. at 567.
129. See Dickson, supra note 99, at 18.
130. See Rupert Loader & Spencer Henson, A View of GMOs From the U.K., 1
AGBIOFORUM 31, 32 fig.1 (1998)<http://www.agbioforum.missouri.edu> (citing a 1995
Food and Drink Federation study).
131. See Jonathan Riley, Document Leak Hits Monsanto, FARMERS WKLY. (Sutton,
Surrey, U.K.), Nov. 27, 1998, at 8. A leaked document from biotechnology giant Monsanto
indicated that despite spending over one million pounds on an advertising campaign
promoting GMOs, the number of consumers who found genetically modified food
unacceptable rose from thirty-five to fifty-one percent in a twelve-month period. See id.
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thirty largest food manufacturers 132 and its four most prominent
supermarket chains were GMO-free.
133
Implementation of U.K. legislation for Directive 90/220
constitutes Part VI of the Environmental Protection Act of
1990.134 The purpose of the Act is to prevent or minimize "any
damage to the environment which may arise from the escape or
release from human control of genetically modified organisms."
135
Prior to any GMO product's release into the environment or
placement on the market, the individual or entity conducting the
release must submit a risk assessment to the Secretary of State for
the Environment 136 and obtain the Secretary's formal consent.
137
In addition to following the E.U. consent procedures the
Directive 90/220 requires, 138 the Secretary of State must consult
with the Advisory Committee on Releases to the Environment
(ACRE).139 The Secretary may revoke consent or attach new
limitations thereto at any time.140 Implied in the Secretary's
consent is the requirement that the consent holder: (1) take all
reasonable steps to keep informed of any risks of damage, 141 (2)
take necessary actions to prevent such damage, 142 and (3) use the
"best available techniques not entailing excessive cost" to prevent
any damage from occurring.14
3
Offenses under the Act include violating consent limitations,
failing to perform proper risk assessment, interfering with an
inspector, and filing false documents. 144 The Act imposes civil and
criminal liability for offenses.145 Although the specific maximums
132. See id.
133. See Genetic Engineering: Major Companies Reject GM-Food, supra note 27.
134. Environmental Protection Act, 1990, ch. 43, pt. VI (Eng.) [hereinafter U.K. EPA].
135. Id. pt. VI, § 106.
136. See id. pt. VI, § 108(a).
137. See id. pt. VI, § 111(1)(b).
138. See generally Directive 90/220 arts. 10-18, supra note 9, at 18-20 (describing the
procedure for obtaining the Commission's consent).
139. See U.K. EPA pt. VI, § 124(1)(a). For an organization flow chart of the U.K.
GMO-release approval process, see U.K. DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY,
BIoGUIDE 25 (1996), available at (visited Aug. 3, 2000)
<www.dti.gov.uk/CB/bioguide/pdf/bioguide.pdf>.
140. See U.K. EPA pt. VI, § 111(10).
141. See id. pt. VI, § 112(5)(a).
142. See id. pt. VI, § 112(5)(b).
143. Id. pt. VI, § 112(5)(c).
144. See generally id. pt. VI, § 118(1)(a)-(o) (specifying offenses under the Act).
145. See id. pt. VI, § 118(3)-(6) (specifying civil and criminal penalties for violations of
the Act).
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vary for each offense, a magistrate's court generally imposes fines
up to £20,000 and prison sentences up to six months. 146 Crown
Court convictions carry unlimited fines and up to five years
imprisonment. 147  The burden of proof in such proceedings
generally shifts to the accused, who, for example, must "prove that
there was no better available technique not entailing excessive
cost than was in fact used to satisfy the condition or to comply
with [the Act]. ' 148 As a defense for failing to keep informed of
any changes in the risk assessment, the accused may "prove that
he took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due
diligence."
149
On February 17, 1999, the U.K. Government levied its first
fines for violating the Act's GMO provision. After Monsanto and
its British subcontractor, Perryfields Holdings, plead guilty, the
Government respectively imposed fines of £17,000 and £14,000.15°
An inspector found the companies violated the six-meter border
requirement established as a condition of granting consent.
151
The actual border between the GMO crops and the neighboring
crops was only "two meters wide -creating a real danger of cross-
pollination with the surrounding area." 152  Consequently, the
consent holders, Monsanto and Perryfields, were held liable.
153
The third-party grower, however, was not liable because
responsibility for following the consent's restrictions is not
delegable. 154 In addition to imposing sanctions, the Secretary also
listed Monsanto and Perryfields in a public "register" of all those
convicted for violating the Act.
155
Fortunately, in the Monsanto case, the inspector corrected
the situation before any harm occurred. If the commission of an
offense causes damage, the state may take reasonable action to
146. See id. pt. VI, § 118(3)(a).
147. See id. pt. VI, § 118(3)(b).
148. Id. pt. VI, § 119(b).
149. Id. pt. VI, § 118(2).
150. See Monsanto, Subcontractor First Fined in U.K. for Breach of Environment Laws
in GMO Test, INT'L ENV'T DAILY (BNA), Mar. 10, 1999, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Bnaied File.
151. See id.
152. Id.
153. See id. ("[A]s consent holders, "Monasto and Perryfields had a legal responsibility
to ensure that a six-meter border was correctly implemented..
154. See id.
155. See U.K. EPA pt. VI, § 122(1)(g).
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remedy the harm caused; 156 costs are recoverable only from those
persons convicted. 157 The current Environmental Protection Act
contains no liability provisions for environmental or other damage
unless there is an "offense," as defined in the statute. 158 On June
24, 1999, Member of Parliament Alan Simpson introduced the
Genetically Modified Food and Producer Liability Bill (GMO
Bill), 159 which provides that persons holding consent to release or
market GMOs in the United Kingdom shall be strictly liable for
damage the GMOs cause. 160 Where a corporation holds consent,
"any director, manager, secretary or other similar officer ... shall
be similarly liable unless he can show that he did everything in ,his
power to prevent the deliberate release or marketing."'161 The
GMO Bill adopts a broad definition of "damage," which includes:
personal injury, damage to property, financial loss, and the costs
of preventing or rectifying environmental damage.162 In the event
of multiple defendants, a plaintiff need only prove that one or
more of the defendants could have caused the damage.
163
Consent holders must secure an insurance policy to pay
compensation damages.164 In the event liability for damage is not
attributable to an identifiable defendant, the Secretary of State
must compensate the harmed person.1
65
The GMO Bill carefully excludes farmers and consumers
from bearing the cost of liability. By assigning liability to consent
holders under the Environmental Protection Act, the proposed
Bill shifts the risks of planting GMOs "to those who are seeking to
introduce alien technology to [the] countryside," not farmers.
166
156. See id. pt. VI, § 121(1)(a)-(b).
157. See id. pt. VI, § 121(1)(b).
158. See Friends of the Earth, supra note 16. See also U.K. EPA pt. VI, § 118 (defining
"offenses"); supra text accompanying note 144 (discussing offenses under the Act).
Neighbors and/or local government may be able to proceed under a theory of nuisance,
trespass, or negligence to halt the environmental damage from spreading to adjacent
property. See, e.g., U.K. EPA pt. III, §§ 79-82 (statutory nuisance procedures). Cf.
discussion of these doctrines applied in the United States, infra Parts IV.B.1, 3.
159. See Simpson Bill, supra note 83.
160. See id. § 2(1).
161. See id. §2(2).
162. Seeid. § 3(1).
163. Seeid. § 4(2).
164. Seeid. § 6(1).
165. See id. § 7.
166. Legislation Introduced in Britain to Hold Companies Liable for Damage Caused
By Genetically Modified Foods, Crops, FOOD CHEMICAL NEWS (Washington, D.C.), July
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Although unlikely to pass the House of Commons, the Bill
elevates the liability debate in the United Kingdom to a new
level.1
67
2. Austria
Of all E.U. Member States, Austria consistently takes the
strongest stance against GMOs. For example, although the use of
Bt-maize is approved throughout the European Union, Austria's
ban on the product remains intact. 168 In 1997, "more than
[twenty] percent of Austrian voters signed a petition calling for a
ban on genetically modified foods and plants."'169 On April 16,
1998, Austria approved what biotechnology firm Novartis
executives refer to as "the strictest [GMO law] in the world,...
leav[ing] the biotechnology industry in Austria with little air to
breathe."1
70
Although the new Austrian law does not forbid the planting
of GMO crops, several aspects of the law essentially accomplish
that goal. Previously, only direct neighbors participated in the
process of responding to requests to plant GMOs. 171 The revised
law permits involvement of not only neighbors, but the also of the
mayor of the village, mayors of neighboring villages, and the
provincial government.172 Furthermore, the new law drastically
changes the membership of the scientific panel charged with
making recommendations to the Minister for Consumer
Protection regarding the approval of test-planting GMOs. 173 In
the past, the Academy of Sciences selected members based on
their genetic expertise. 174 The new law provides that four of the
12, 1999, at NA, available in LEXIS, Education Law Library, Iacnws File (quoting
Parliament Member Simpson during a House of Commons debate June 30, 1999).
167. See id.
168. See EU in Disarray Over Policy, Control of Trade in Genetically Modified
Organisms, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA), Dec. 14, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Bnaitd File.
169. Susan Ladika, Austria Approves One of Toughest Laws in Europe on Genetically
Modified Organisms, 21 INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) 409, 409 (Apr. 29, 1998).
170. Id. at 410 (quoting Novaris Austria President Erwin Schillinger, referring to
BGB1 Nr. 510/1994 (Aus.)).
171. See id. at 409.
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. See id.
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members also must be "scientists with expertise in areas such as
ecology and entomology.
'" 175
Liability for illegally releasing GMOs increased from 50,000
to 300,000 schillings. 176  In the event of an accident involving
GMOs, the releasing company will be liable for any harm to
health, property, or the environment, and must return the
property to its "original" state. 177 When a GMO is involved in an
"isolated instance," and the damage is "observable," it will be
assumed that the GMO caused the damage. 178 The Austrian
Parliament delayed the liability provisions' effective date to allow
companies time to acquire liability insurance.179 The amount of
insurance required varies with the scale of each operation. Small-
scale operations have no statutory minimum amount, but must
carry insurance sufficient to meet their liabilities. 180 Large-scale
or freestanding operations must carry liability insurance of
9,800,000 schillings. 181 Operations classified as both large-scale
and freestanding operations must have insurance of 56,000,000
schillings.182 In sum, the provisions of the Austrian GMO law
create a climate hostile to GMO technology, yet still fall within the
broad scope of Directive 90/220.
3. Germany
Germany's approach to GMO technology changes with the
daily political climate. Germany initially backed Directive 90/220
to avoid politically damaging public debate between
environmental supporters (the Greens) and the biotechnology
industry, which saw itself falling behind competitors in other
European countries and the United States. 183 The 1990 German
Biotechnology Act (Gesetz zur Regelung der Gentechnik)
184
175. Id.
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. See § 79(e) BGB1 510/1994 (Aus.) (as amended April 16, 1999) (establishing strict
liability for GMO related damage).
179. See Ladika, supra note 166, at 409.
180. See § 79(j) BGB1 510/1994.
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. See Baiter, supra notes 98-108; see also Steven M. Pepa, International Trade and
Emerging Genetic Regulatory Regimes, 29 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 415, 439 (1998)
(stating that up until the early 1990s, the German public opposed the basic concepts of
genetic research due to the negative memories of the Nazis).
184. See Monique P. Nion, Biotechnology and Environmental Law in Europe, 34
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implemented Directive 90/220 (deliberate release of GMOs) and
Directive 90/219 (contained use of GMOs). 185  The highly
bureaucratic research regulations constrained domestic
investment in biotechnology, resulting in German corporations
transferring research activities to the relatively unregulated
United States. 186 The German statute was amended in 1993, and
again in 1994, to relax research protocols and encourage domestic
investment. 187 In another change of attitude, in late 1998, the new
coalition government, which includes the Greens, promised a
more cautious approach, perhaps modeled on Austria's
regulations. 188 The new government criticized its predecessors for
monitoring GMO effects from a short-term perspective only and
releasing too many GMOs into the environment without sufficient
knowledge.
189
The current German genetic technology law categorizes
GMO products according to their potential risk to health and the
environment.190  Relatively relaxed approval standards and
simplified procedures for authorization to release or market
GMOs are available for "specific organisms if there is no risk for
public health or the environment." 191 Furthermore, Germany,
without further independent investigation, recognizes permits
from other Member States with comparable regulations.192 As in
the other Member States, risk assessments and safety precautions
must be undertaken prior to commencing any GMO operation.
193
German law imposes liability for injury to property or human
health "caused by characteristics of an organism created in a
biotechnological process." 194  In contrast to Austria's liability
scheme, liability under German law does not encompass
JURIMETRICS J. 317, 325 & n.73 (1994) (citing German Biotechnology Act (GenTG)
(F.R.G.)).
185. See Council Directive 90/219/EEC of 23 April 1990 on the Contained Use of
Genetically Modified Micro-organisms, 1990 O.J. (L 117) 1 [hereinafter Directive 90/219].
186. See Pepa, supra note 183, at 439.
187. See id. at 439 n83.
188. See Coalition Government to Take More Cautious Approach to Genetically
Modified Foodstuffs, 21 INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1176, 1176 (Nov. 25, 1998).
189. See id.
190. See Nion, supra note 184, at 325 & n.75 (citing § 7 GenTG (F.R.G.)).
191. Id. at 326 & n.83 (citing § 14, Abs. 4 GenTG (F.R.G.)).
192. See id. at 356 & n.84 (citing § 14, Abs. 5 GenTG (F.R.G.)).
193. See id. at 327 & 89 (citing § 16 GenTG (F.R.G.)).
194. Id. at 327 & n.91 (citing §§ 32 et seq. GenTG (F.R.G.)).
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environmental damage GMOs cause. 195  Regulations place
liability for such injuries at the "manager" level of the
installation.196  It is not clear, however, exactly how liability
attaches to the GMO's developer or importer. If liability is
restricted to the manager level, farmers, as installation managers,
may be left with tremendous liability exposures, while the large
biotechnology conglomerates remain insulated. In order to relax
the burden of proof for plaintiffs, the law presumes that any
damage a GMO causes is the result of biotechnology-induced
characteristics, and not the organism's "natural" traits.197 This
strict liability scheme assists plaintiffs by recognizing that
technology, when released into the environment, entails risk
regardless of the amount of testing and precautions undertaken.
198
To protect against liability, operators creating these risks must
secure insurance. 199 Plaintiff recovery, however, is limited to DM
160 million.
200
German Civil law may also provide compensation for damage
GMOs cause. The Umwelthaftungsgesetz, or Environmental
Liability Act of 1990,201 is "the most important civil law statute for
damages caused by environmental pollution." 20 2  The Act
provides liability for harms to the environment caused by certain
installations designated in the Act. 203 GMO installations, are not
specifically designated in the Act, and therefore fall outside of the
Act=s protections. 20 4 The Act does not preempt imposing liability
195. Compare id. (citing § 32 GenTG (F.R.G.) (imposing liability for "death, personal
injury , and damage to property caused by characteristics of an organism created by the
biotechnological process)) with Ladika, supra note 169, at 409 (discussing BGB1 Nr.
510/1994 (Aus.) (imposing liability for damage to "health, property, or the
environment")).
196. See Nion, supra note 184, at 327.
197. See id. at 327 & n.92 (citing § 34 GenTG (F.R.G.)).
198. See Stephen Kelly Lewis, Comment, "Attack of the Killer Tomatoes?" Corporate
Liability for the International Propagation of Genetically Altered Agricultural Products, 10
TRANSNAT'LLAW. 153, 192-193 (1997).
199. See id. at 193 & n.399 (citing § 36 GenTG (F.R.G.)).
200. See Nion, supra note 184, at 327 & n.93 (citing § 33 GenTG (F.R.G.)).
201. Gesetz 0ber die Umwelthaftung (Umwelthaftungsgesetz UmweltHG), v.
10.12.1990 (BGB1. I S. 2634) (F.R.G.) [hereinafter UmweltHG], translated in GERMAN
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR PRACTITIONERS 603 (Horst Schlemminger et al. eds., 1996).
202. ELGA BARTSCH, LIABILITY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGES: INCENTIVES FOR
PRECAUTION AND RISK ALLOCATION 26 (1998).
203. See UmweltHG § 1 (F.R.G.), translated in GERMAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR
PRACTIIONERS, supra note 201, at 603.
204. See UmweltHG app. I (F.R.G.), translated in GERMAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
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for environmental or other damage under other provisions of the
German Civil Code.
20 5
The general tort and nuisance provisions in the Biirgerliches
Gesetzbuch (BGB), or German Civil Code, apply to
environmental pollution. BGB section 823 imposes tort liability
on any person who intentionally or negligently causes harm to
"the life, body, health, freedom, property, or other right of
another ... "206 Compensation may not be available under
Section 823 for purely economic damage GMOs cause, such as
cross-pollination of an organic crop. Environmental harm to
protected rights raises "difficulties of proof associated with
demonstrating causality and fault. '20 7 The German Supreme
Court recently shifted the burden of proof in cases involving tort
claims for environmental damage from the plaintiff to the
defendant. 20 8 The defendant now must prove that he or she was
not negligent and that he or she took all appropriate
precautionary measures. 20 9 The burden of proof for causation,
however, remains on the plaintiff.2
10
The United Kingdom, Austria, and Germany each regulated
biotechnology prior to passage of Directive 90/220.211 Although
the Directive attempted to harmonize the various Member States'
biotechnology laws, subtle differences, especially with respect to
liability, persevere. Variances in imposing liability will continue
until the European Union specifically addresses liability via a
revised Directive 90/220 or other legislation.
FOR PRACTITIONERS, supra note 201, at 618-637 (listing the installations subject to the
Act).
205. See UmweltHG § 18(1) (F.R.G.), translated in GERMAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
FOR PRACTITIONERS, supra note 201, at 613 ("Liability existing on the basis of other
provisions shall not be affected by this Act.").
206. § 823 Burgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) (F.R.G.). See also BARTSCH, supra note
202, at 27-28.
207. GERMAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR PRACTITIONERS, supra note 201, at 176.
For a discussion of the problems associated with determining causality and fault, cf infra
Part IV.B.1 (describing the problems in the context of U.S. common law liability).
208. See BARTSCH, supra note 202, at 28.
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. See supra Parts III.B.1-3 (discussing regulation of biotechnology in the United
Kingdom, Austria, and Germany prior to Directive 90/220).
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IV. GMO REGULATIONS AND LIABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES
A. The U.S. Federal Regulatory Scheme
As genetic engineering expanded in the 1970s, the National
Institutes of Health (NIH) assumed supervisory responsibility and
developed research guidelines. 212 The NIH originally prohibited
all GMO releases, but by 1978, the Director of the NIH began
approving GMO field tests.213 As application of biotechnology
expanded outside the laboratory, "federal agencies assumed
jurisdiction over the products of genetic engineering that fell
within their traditional fields of regulation."214  In 1985, the
Biotechnology Science Coordinating Committee (BSCC) was
established "to coordinate the policies of the various agencies
having authority to regulate biotechnology products." 215  The
following year, the Office of Science and Technology Policy issued
the Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of
Biotechnology.216  The Reagan administration, following its
general policy of providing regulatory relief, concluded that a new
law was not necessary to regulate biotechnology and the diversity
of biotechnology products justified dividing supervision among
multiple government agencies.
217
The legacy of the Office of Science and Technology Policy's
decision to divide GMO supervision responsibility among several
government agencies continues. The United States Department
of Agriculture (USDA) ensures that GMOs are "safe to grow,"
the FDA ensures that they are "safe to eat, 218 and the EPA
212. See Judy J. Kim, Out of the Lab and into the Field: Harmonization of Deliberate
Release Regulations for Genetically Modified Organisms, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1160,
1178 (1992-1993); David J. Earp, The Regulation of Genetically Engineered Plants: Is Peter
Rabbit Safe in Mr. McGregor's Transgenic Vegetable Patch?, 24 ENVTL. L. 1633, 1640
(1994).
213. See Kim, supra note 212, at 1178-1179.
214. Earp, supra note 212, at 1640.
215. Id.
216. See Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg.
23, 302 (1986).
217. See Kim, supra note 212, at 1179-1180 (describing the Coordinated Framework
Policy's conclusions); Earp, supra note 212, at 1641 (describing the same).
218. USDA, Animal & Plant Health Inspection Service, United States Regulatory
Oversight in Biotechnology (visited Aug. 5, 1999)
<http://www.aphis.usda.gov/biotech/OECD/usregs.htm#usdalaw>.
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oversees the use of new companion herbicides for GMOs and
ensures that the GMOs are "safe for the environment. '219
The EPA derives its authority to regulate GMOs from the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA),22 °
the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 221 and the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA).222 The TSCA's
notification requirements apply to nonagricultural uses of
biotechnology.223 The FFDCA regulates pesticide residues in or
on food,224 which may include plants with pesticide properties,
such as Bt corn. The FIFRA directly applies to any plants with
pesticide properties, or microorganisms intended for use as
pesticides. 225  These pesticides must be registered with the
EPA,226 and a permit must be acquired prior to field-testing.227 In
issuing the permit, the EPA must "balance the potential human
and environmental risks against the potential benefits to
society." 2
28
The FDA regulates genetically modified food products under
the FFDCA for food safety, but its authority is generally limited to
the marketing aspects of GMO products.229 Currently, there is no
U.S. GMO labeling law, but some health-food companies
voluntarily label their products "non-GMO. '230 In October 1999,
the FDA announced it would conduct hearings to gage public
opinion on the issue of labeling all products containing GMOs.231
The USDA, under the Federal Plant Pest Act (FPPA)232 and
the Plant Quarantine Act,233 regulates the release of GMOs in
219. Id.
220. 7 U.S.C. § 136 -1 36y (1994).
221. 15 U.S.C. § 2601-2629 (1994).
222. 21 U.S.C. § 301-392 (1994).
223. See Allen, supra note 40, at 543.
224. See 21 U.S.C. § 231(q)(2).
225. See 7 U.S.C. § 136(a).
226. See id.
227. See Kim, supra note 212, at 1180-1181 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 158.170 (1991)).
228. Mary Jane Angelo, Genetically Engineered Plant Pesticides: Recent Developments
in the EPA's Regulation of Biotechnology, 7 FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 257, 264 (1996). The
required balancing the potential risks against the possible benefits is the basis for the
recent Environmental Defense Fund petition to the EPA to reassess the risks associated
with Bt corn after publication of the Cornell Monarch butterflies study. See Werner, supra
note 3, at 714.
229. See Kim, supra note 212, at 1182.
230. See Strecklow, supra note 27, at Al.
231. See id.
232. 7 U.S.C. § 150aa-150jj (1994).
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agricultural research. The 1987 regulations required a permit
prior to the import, or release into the environment, of any
genetically modified plant or organism engineered from
components of plant pests, including those with pesticide
effects. 234 In 1993, the USDA downgraded its regulation to
require only "notification" prior to introduction of plants with
which the agency had sufficient experience. 235 In addition, the
revised 1993 regulations provided that the Administrator of the
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) division of
the USDA declare certain GMOs no longer a risk, and thus not
subject to regulation.236  On June 6, 1997, APHIS granted
Monsanto's genetically engineered corn line "nonregulated"
status.237  New USDA regulations now also provide for
"expedited review" of plants closely related to plants already
granted nonregulated status.
238
B. Liability
Although it is often considered a world leader in
biotechnology, the United States has not yet adopted a
comprehensive regulatory scheme expressly addressing
biotechnology's unique needs. Congress failed to provide for
liability in the event of damage resulting from GMO use by
allowing agencies to only modify existing regulations to cover
biotechnology in a piecemeal fashion.239 Neither the regulatory
233. 7 U.S.C. §§ 151-164a, 166-167 (1994).
234. See Angelo, supra note 228, at 271 & n.71 (citing 52 Fed. Reg. 22,892 (1987)
(codified at 7 C.F.R. pts. 330, 340 (proposed June 16, 1987)).
235. See id. at 271 & n.77 (citing 58 Fed. Reg. 17,044 (1993) (codified at 7 C.F.R. pt.
340 (proposed Mar. 31, 1993)); Earp, supra note 212, at 1662-1663 (describing the 1993
revisions' substantial deregulation of the release of transgenic plants).
236. See Angelo, supra note 228, at 272.
237. See Monsanto Corn Line No Longer Regulated Under U.S. Agriculture
Department's Laws, 20 INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) 613, 613 (June 25, 1997).
238. See 62 Fed. Reg. 19903 (1997).
239. See Lewis, supra note 198, at 178. When Congress chooses to regulate activities
with environmental implications, Congress generally includes specific liability provisions
therein. See, e.g., Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) § 3013(e), 42 U.S.C.
§ 6934(a) (1995) (imposing civil penalties up to $5,000 per day for noncompliance);
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) §
107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1995) (imposing joint and several liability for all cleanup
costs); Clean Air Act (CAA) § 113(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (1995) (authorizing injunctions
and civil penalties up to $25,000 per day for each violation); Clean Water Act (CWA) §
309(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1995) (imposing civil penalties up to $25,000 per day for each
violation).
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agencies nor citizens may use the various federal laws regulating
biotechnology to recover for GMO-caused damage. A few states
have enacted statutes, however, to monitor biotechnology activity
within their respective jurisdictions.240 Unfortunately, these state
statutes are generally limited to notification and permit
requirements and lack liability provisions. As a result, victims
must rely on one of three possible common law doctrines for a
remedy-negligence, strict liability, or nuisance.
An example of possible damage resulting from the use of a
GMO is cross-pollination of an organic crop with genetically
modified pollen from an adjacent field. Although many
biotechnology experts doubt the likelihood of this scenario
occurring, as discussed earlier, for organic tortilla chip processor
Terra Prima, this possibility is all too real. Although the Terra
Prima contamination could, theoretically, have occurred at several
stages of the supply chain, Terra Prima executives determined that
the probable cause was pollen from genetically modified corn in
"nearby fields." 241
Recent studies in the United Kingdom conducted by a bee
specialist working with the National Pollen Research Unit found
airborne genetically modified pollen 475 meters from a genetically
modified field, and genetically modified pollen in bee hives up to
four and a half kilometers from a genetically modified field.242
Accordingly, a brief analysis of possible claims under a common
law liability scheme from a cross-pollination scenario follows.
1. Negligence
According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, negligence is
either:
(a) an act which the actor as a reasonable man should recognize
as involving an unreasonable risk of causing an invasion of an
interest of another, or (b) a failure to do an act which is
necessary for the protection or assistance of another and which
the actor is under a duty to do.2
4 3
240. See, e.g., Release of Genetically Engineered Organisms Act, 430 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 95/0.01 (West 1999); Genetically Engineered Organisms, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 18F
(West 1998); Genetically Modified Organisms, HAW. REV. STAT. § 321-11.6 (1999).
241. Hogue, supra note 13, at 196 (quoting Charles Walker, president of Terra Prima).
242. See Friends of the Earth, supra note 16.
243. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 284 (1965).
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There are five traditional elements a plaintiff must prove to
establish a negligence cause of action: duty, breach, factual
causation, proximate causation, and actual injury. 244
a. Duty
Two possible theories of "duty" apply when damage results
from the use of a GMO that pollinates a neighboring farmer's
organic crops.245  A duty may arise from the improper
performance of an otherwise lawful act: "anyone who does an
affirmative act is under a duty to others to exercise the care of a
reasonable man to protect them against an unreasonable risk of
harm arising out of the act."'246 An individual, with proper
governmental authorization, may plant GMOs. Improper
performance of or compliance with this authorization may give
rise to a duty even in the absence of statutory liability. This duty
arises if the defendant's conduct created a risk of damage and the
plaintiff was foreseeable. The existence of federal regulations
governing GMO experimentation, as well as scientific reports of
cross-pollination, may satisfy the showing of a risk of damage.247
Furthermore, it is foreseeable that a neighboring field would be
affected given the possibility of cross-pollination.
In Rowland v. Christian,248 the California Supreme Court
balanced several factors and thereafter recognized that, in the
absence of a statutory exemption, the general "duty to exercise
reasonable care under the circumstances" should not be departed
from "unless clearly supported by public policy." 249 The factors
the Court balanced in considering such a departure include:
the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the
connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury
suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct,
the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden
to the defendant and consequences to the community of
imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for
244. See W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 164-165 (5th ed. 1984).
245. See supra note 242-243 and accompanying text describing one possible example of
cross-pollination of organic crops. See Friends of the Earth, supra note 16.
246. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302 cmt. a, supra note 243.
247. See Lewis, supra note 198, at 181.
248. 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968).
249. Id. at 564.
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance
for the risk involved.
250
Although Rowland involved the plaintiff's injury sustained while
on the defendant's property, other courts have used the Rowland
factors to establish various duties as a matter of public policy.2
51
Accordingly, evaluation of the Rowland factors could impose a
duty of care upon defendants in the GMO context.
In a case involving cross-pollination of an organic farm with
genetically modified pollen from an adjacent field, the harm may
be foreseeable for the above-described reasons. The second
Rowland factor, the certainty of the harm, depends on the
likelihood of cross-pollination of the crops and the detection of
the "contaminated" organic crops. Once detected, the degree of
certainty of injury is absolute because the farmer's crops
immediately lose organic status. The degree of closeness of the
connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury, the
third Rowland factor, is essentially the test for proximate cause, as
discussed below. 252 A court may find it difficult to blame a
defendant for exercising poor judgment if the defendant followed
all applicable regulations. Establishing a duty may prevent future
harm, because GMO users may take extra precautions. Such
precautions could include planting wider buffer zones between
genetically modified and non-genetically modified crops, careful
cleaning of equipment processing both genetically modified and
non-genetically modified foods, and appropriate time lapses
before organic crops are grown in fields wherein genetically
modified crops previously grew.253 Only the GMO producers
have full knowledge of the possible risks-thus they are best able
to structure insurance to guard thereagainst. The biotechnology
250. Id.
251. See, e.g., Slade v. Smith's Mgmt. Corp., 808 P.2d 401, 411 (Idaho 1991) (using the
Rowland factors to impose a duty on a party host ("[It is] evident that the service of
alcoholic beverages to an obviously intoxicated person by one who knows that such
intoxicated person intends to drive a motor vehicle creates a reasonably foreseeable risk of
injury to those on the highway")); Griffith v. Southland Corp., 617 A.2d 598, 604 (Md.
1992) (applying the Rowland factors to impose a duty on an employee to allow an
individual to use a phone to summon police, which probably would have resulted in a
shortened response time and may have prevented a fatal shooting).
252. See discussion infra Part IV.B.1.d.
253. See John Innes Centre, supra note 12 (presenting an executive summary of the
Centre's report commissioned by the U.K. Ministry of Agriculture Forests and Fisheries).
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industry can offset the costs of insurance by passing the costs on to
consumers.
254
An industry entering into biotechnology research for profit
should have a minimum duty to protect society from possible
damages, even in the face of congressional inaction. Courts may
have difficulty, however, extending this duty beyond farmers who
plant genetically modified crops in fields adjacent to organic crops.
Farmers planting genetically modified crops could face severe
pressure from two fronts-the large seed companies selling
genetically modified seeds and neighboring farms using organic
methods. Unless courts impose a duty on genetically modified
seed developers, little incentive exists to re-engineer seeds to
eliminate the chances of cross-pollination or conduct field tests to
determine effective methods for pollen containment.
An analysis of where the costs and benefits of a potentially
negligent action lie may ultimately determine whether a court
would impose a duty on farmers who plant genetically modified
crops. The Kansas Court of Appeals, in Krug v. Koriel,255 failed
to find a common law duty to control volunteer wheat as a means
of preventing the spread of the wheat streak mosaic virus. 256 In
Krug, volunteer wheat from the defendant's field contained the
virus, which spread to the plaintiff's wheat field and damaged his
crop.257  Normally, defendants have incentive to take
precautionary measures, as they would not otherwise receive
economic benefits (e.g., increased yields). The economic benefit,
if a court were to establish a duty, would instead fall on the
plaintiff. The Krug court, however, correctly refused to establish a
common law duty to prevent the spread of a virus.258 In the GMO
context, the GMO user/defendant receives the economic benefit
from the activity causing the harm. If a duty were established, the
non-GMO farmer would receive a portion of the economic benefit
the GMO user received from planting genetically modified crops.
In Krug, the plaintiff would have received an economic benefit
from the defendant who, in turn, received nothing. A finding of a
duty to control genetically modified pollen would re-establish the
pre-GMO allocation of costs and benefits among adjacent farmers.
254. See Lewis, supra note 198, at 182.
255. 935 P.2d 1063 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997).
256. See id. at 1063.
257. See id. at 1064-1065.
258. See id. at 1063.
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b. Breach
Judge Learned Hand's famous opinion in United States v.
Carroll Towing Co. 2 59 balanced the burdens involved in avoiding
risk against the magnitude and propensity of risk to determine a
breach of duty. 260 In a GMO scenario, the magnitude of risk
involved varies from a single cross-pollination to destruction of an
entire crop. According to some commentators, the gravity of
harm includes the loss of biodiversity and possibly the world food
supply.261 The product's utility, however, may outweigh these
concerns because GMOs may reduce pesticide and herbicide
use, 262 and by increasing yields, are touted as a potential factor in
the cure for world hunger. 263 On balance, to find breach of duty, a
court must rely heavily on the possible, yet highly unlikely,
possibility that biotechnology will cause grave damage.
c. Factual Causation
Factual causation, or cause-in-fact, is determined by the
traditional "but for" test.264 "But for" the GMO, would there be a
destructive cross-pollination? Plaintiffs can prove "but for"
causation through analysis of the genetic composition of crops in
surrounding fields. There might be difficulty, however, if there
are multiple possible pollination sources. For example, if the
owners of four surrounding fields each plant the same GMO, and
the plaintiff's field contains traces of the GMO, proving which of
the surrounding fields' crops actually "caused" the pollination
creates complexity.265 Although in this example, the neighboring
farmers might escape liability, the GMOs' developer, as the
259. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
260. See id. at 173.
261. See Lewis, supra note 198, at 182-183.
262. See Environmental Benefits of YieldGard® Corn, supra note 7; see also USDA
Report Cites Pesticide Reductions and Yield Increases Associated with Biotech Crops,
(visited Oct. 10, 1999) <http://www.monsanto.comlag/articles/99-07-07ERSStudy.htm>
[hereinafter USDA Report].
263. See USDA Report, supra note 262 (stating that biotechnology could contribute to
food security in developing countries); see also Ismail Serageldin, Viewpoint,
Biotechnology and Food Security in the 21st Century, 285 SCIENCE 387, 387 (1999) (noting
that biotechnology "can contribute to future food security if it benefits sustainable small-
farm agriculture in developing countries.").
264. See KEETON, supra note 244, at 265.
265. An alternative theory, such as market share liability, may apply in such
circumstances. See generally McCormack v. Abbott Labs., 617 F. Supp. 1521, 1524-1526
(D. Mass 1985) (discussing the history of market share liability).
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producer of seeds for all four surrounding fields, ultimately caused
the damage. Some proposals for GMO regulations, especially in
Europe, call for genetic markers to be placed in all GMO
products.266 This would assist in establishing causation by easing
the burden of identifying the GMO's developer and tracing the
sale of the GMO seed to a neighboring field.
d. Proximate Cause
Proximate cause turns on the foreseeability of the injury.
267
If the defendant knew or should know, that his or her use of
GMOs could result in harm to another, then the injury resulting is
foreseeable. In a cross-pollination case, the injury is probably
foreseeable because studies found pollen carried, whether by wind
or by bees, beyond established buffer zones.268 Unless the cross-
pollination occurred at a very great distance, such injury would be
foreseeable.
e. Actual Injury
Proving the actual injury may be the easiest element for the
GMO plaintiff to establish. Mere evidence of damaged crops, or
traditionally developed crops containing genetically modified
DNA, would prove injury. In the Terra Prima tortilla chip case,269
the injury was the company's lost profits. Although the injury may
be relatively obvious, proving the other four elements may be
difficult, because there is no judicial precedent for recovery based
on a negligence theory in a GMO case.
An injured party faces an arduous, but not impossible, task in
recovering damages based on a negligence theory. Hypothetically,
a plaintiff's most significant obstacle is convincing a court to
impose a duty on farmers planting genetically modified seeds
approved by the USDA and/or EPA for general use.
Redistributing the economic benefit of planting genetically
modified seeds to those the planting harms provides the strongest
justification for establishing a duty of care.
266. See Parliament Resolution art. 4(lb), supra note 35.
267. See KEETON, supra note 244, at 273.
268. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 16-17 (discussing a recent study
conducted in the United Kingdom).
269. See Friends of the Earth, supra note 16; see also supra Part IV.B.
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2. Strict Liability
Strict liability applies when injury occurs as a result of
activities a statute or a court defines as "abnormally
dangerous." 270 Under a negligence theory, a plaintiff must prove
that the defendant caused the harm and that the defendant's
actions were unreasonable. Strict liability, on the other hand,
removes the issue of unreasonableness, and imposes liability
without fault.271 The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides six
factors courts consider in determining if an activity is abnormally
dangerous:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the
person, land or chattels of others; (b) likelihood that the harm
that results from it will be great; (c) inability to eliminate the
risk by the exercise of reasonable care; (d) extent to which the
activity is not a matter of common usage; (e) inappropriateness
of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and (f) extent
to which its value to the community is outweighed by its
dangerous attributes.
272
Although courts consider all six factors, "it is not necessary that
each of them be present, especially if others weigh heavily."
273
Evaluation of factors (a), (b), (c) and (f) parallels the analysis for
negligence recovery. Therefore, only factors (d) and (e) are
discussed below.
The extent to which an activity is a "matter of common
usage" may vary with time and location. Five years ago, the idea
of using GMOs in commercial agriculture was a relatively novel
concept. By 1999, however, half of the United States' seventy-two
million acres of soybeans were planted with genetically modified
seeds.274 At the same time, estimates for genetically modified
corn ranged from twenty to forty-five percent of the nation's corn
plantings.275 By the year 2000, some estimate that 60 million
270. KEETON, supra note 244, at 545.
271. See JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS 554 (4th ed. 1994)
(describing the difference between recovery under negligence and strict liability).
272. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520(a)-(f), supra note 243.
273. Id. § 520 cmt. f. "The essential question is whether the risk created is so unusual,
either because of its magnitude or because of the circumstances surrounding it, as to justify
the imposition of strict liability for the harm that results from it, even though it is carried
on with all reasonable care." Id.
274. See Philip H. Abelson & Pamela J. Hines, The Plant Revolution, 285 SCIENCE 367,
367 (1999).
275. See David Barboza, Biotech Companies Take on Critics of Gene-Altered Food,
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hectares worldwide will be cultivated with GMOs. 276 Therefore,
in the context of total world agricultural production, although
GMOs may not be "common," their acceptance is quickly
growing. More importantly, a plaintiff may establish that the use
of GMOs is inappropriate or uncommon in a particular location.
For example, example, the use of Roundup Ready soybeans in
Illinois or Iowa may be common and appropriate for general use
on typical farmlands. In contrast, the use of genetically modified
crops in portions of California or Oregon that are dominated by
organic farms may be inappropriate. Although this may interfere
with the landowners' traditional right to use their land as they
please, courts have upheld such distinctions in other
circumstances.
In Rylands v. Fletcher,277 the court held that altering the
natural flow of water to create a reservoir was a strict liability
offense if damage occurred to an adjacent landowner's
property. 278 In a case with almost identical facts, the Texas
Supreme Court rejected Rylands, reasoning that creating a
reservoir in an area in which water is scarce is common, and is
therefore not subject to strict liability.279 Therefore, using GMOs
may only be appropriate after close consideration of the
surrounding land use.
The Rylands case, however, may stand for a broader principle
justifying strict liability not easily distinguished by mere
examination of the surrounding land use. The defendant in
Rylands essentially introduced an alien substance (water) onto his
land. Upon the alien substance's escape, the person responsible
for its introduction is responsible for the damage caused. The
planter of genetically modified seeds unquestionably introduces
an alien substance onto his or her land. The substance's escape, in
the form of pollen, may cause damage to surrounding lands.
Following the reasoning in Rylands, U.S. courts could justify
imposing strict liability for the substance's release.
Under a strict liability theory, a plaintiff's burden of proof is
substantially easier than under a negligence theory. Determining
what constitutes abnormally dangerous activities, however,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1999, at Al.
276. See Rapid Growth in GMO Plantings, supra note 41, at M/5.
277. [1861-1873] All E.R. Rep. 1 (1866) (Ex. Ch.).
278. See id. at 6-7 (Blackburn, J.).
279. See Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 96 S.W.2d 221,222-223 (Tex. 1936).
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involves a balancing test, which often favors public policy. Similar
to negligence, strict liability provides no direct precedent upon
which courts can rely for a GMO analysis. 280 Courts could,
however, analogize the cross-pollination of genetically modified
crops via to wind drift to earlier cases involving crop dusting.
In Gotreaux v. Gary,281 the Louisiana Supreme Court held a
landowner strictly liable for damage to a neighboring cotton crop
located three and one-quarter miles away. 282 The defendant
sprayed his rice field with herbicides. 283 Eight to ten days later,
the plaintiff's cotton crop showed chemical damage indicative of
the type of chemical the defendant used.284 In finding that using
herbicides is an inherently dangerous activity subject to strict
liability, the Court balanced the value of the crop dusting to the
farmer against the possible externalities. 285 The benefits accrued
to the farmer dusting his crop through increased yields. The
increased yields resulting from crop dusting, however, were not
sufficient to justify the damage to the adjacent farmer's crops.286
Likewise, the yield increases genetically modified crops provide
may not be sufficient to justify damage to adjacent farmers' crops.
A potential defendant, however, could argue a plaintiff's
abnormally sensitive activity, especially in the organic farming
context, as a defense. The Restatement (Second) of Torts
contemplates relaxing strict liability standards "if the harm would
280. Although it should be noted that courts have found strict liability for the
transportation or storage of hazardous materials and explosives. See James F. Roberts,
Note, Common Carriers and Risk Distribution: Absolute Liability for Transportation of
Hazardous Materials, 67 KY. L.J. 441 (1978-1979) (hazardous materials); see also Chavez
v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 413 F. Supp. 1203 (E.D. Cal. 1976) (explosives).
281. 94 So. 2d 293 (La. 1957).
282. See id. at 294-295. See also Kennedy v. Clayton, 227 S.w.2d 934, 936, 940 (Ark.
1950) (holding defendant liable for damage to neighboring cotton crop caused by spraying
rice field even though the defendant thought the drift was less than 75 feet unless windy,
he sprayed on a calm day, and argued he was not. sufficiently put on notice); see also
Binder v. Perkins, 516 P.2d 1012, 1015-1016 (Kan. 1973) (holding defendant wheat field
sprayer liable for damage to neighboring alfalfa crop because the defendant knew or
should have known fumes could escape for two days following application, knew of the
alfalfa field's existence, and knew of the possibility of a wind shift).
283. See Gotreaux, 94 So. 2d at 293.
284. See id. at 294.
285. See id. at 294-295 (discussing the applicability of strict liability).
286. See id. at 295-296 ("Although the use of the spraying operation was lawful, it was
carried out in such a manner as to unreasonably inconvenience plaintiff and deprive him of
the liberty of enjoying his farm.").
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not have resulted but for the abnormally sensitive character of the
plaintiff's activity." 287
The concept of nonreciprocal risk may also justify imposing
strict liability in the GMO context. 28 8 Nonreciprocal risk is a risk a
defendant creates "that exceeds those to which he is reciprocally
subject. ' 289 When a defendant plants genetically modified crops,
he subjects his neighbors to risks to which he is not subjected.
Genetically modified crops may contain traces of non-genetically
modified pollen, while organic or traditionally grown crops may
not. In order to correct the imbalance of risks genetically
modified pollen creates, courts could apply a strict liability theory
to damaged crops.
3. Public and Private Nuisance
Under negligence and strict liability theories, claims are
limited to those plaintiffs who are damaged by the GMO activities.
Public nuisance theories allow the government, and possibly
private individuals, to enjoin activities290 and recover damages291
for "unreasonable interference with a right common to the general
public." 292 Private nuisance rights provide private parties with the
power to enforce injunctions and receive damages for
unreasonable interference with their use and enjoyment of their
property. 29
3
a. Public Nuisance
The public nuisance doctrine provides local governments with
the power to protect their jurisdictions' environments, as long as
federal and state regulations do not preempt such action.294 In the
287. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 524A, supra note 243.
288. See George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV.
537, 547-548 (1972) (qualifying the concept of nonreciprocal risk as especially relevant in
justifying strict liability).
289. See id.
290. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C(2), supra note 243.
291. Seeid. § 821C(1).
292. Id. § 821B.
293. See id. § 821D.
294. See generally ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION:
LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY 87-102 (2d ed. 1996) (describing the evolution of public
nuisance theory in protecting the environment). In Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206
U.S. 230, 239 (1907), the U.S. Supreme Court enjoined the operation of a copper smelter
in Tennessee that destroyed forests, orchards, and crops in Georgia.
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GMO context, this includes the cross-pollination of local resources
with GMOs from neighboring fields. The Restatement (Second) of
Torts limits the public nuisance doctrine's application to those
interferences that are "unreasonable. '" 295 Courts should consider
whether the conduct (a) significantly inters with public health,
safety, peace, or comfort; (b) is illegal; or (c) "whether the conduct
is of a continuing nature or has produced a permanent or long-
lasting effect, and, as the actor knows or has reason to know, has a
significant effect upon the public right. ' 296 Private individuals
may maintain a public nuisance action only if they "have suffered
harm of a kind different from that suffered by other members of
the public ... ."297 In a simple cross-pollination scenario, the
general public does not suffer interference with health, safety,
peace, or comfort-only the farmer with the contaminated crops
suffers injury. Therefore, the doctrine of public nuisance may not
provide adequate relief to those individuals whose crops
genetically modified pollen affects.
b. Private Nuisance
A defendant's actions interfering with a plaintiff's private use
and enjoyment of his or her own land may be considered a private
nuisance.298 Genetically modified pollen drifting onto an organic
or traditionally planted field may be an unreasonable interference
in a plaintiff landowner's use and enjoyment of his or her land. In
Regina v. Secretary of the State for the Environment, Transport and
the Regions, Ex parte Watson ,299 Lord Justice Buxton described an
organic farmer's request to enjoin the government from approving
a trial planting of genetically modified corn in an adjacent field as
"one of private nuisance." 300
Although actions giving rise to nuisance culpability vary, a
number of courts impose liability in the absence of intent. In Jost
v. Dairyland Power Cooperative,30 1 the Wisconsin Supreme Court
held a coal-burning electric-generating plant liable for creating a
295. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(2), supra note 243.
296. Id. § 821B(2)(a)-(c).
297. Id. § 821C(1).
298. See id. § 821D.
299. [1999] Env. L. Rep. 310 (Eng. C.A. July 21, 1998), available in 1998 WL 1042193.
300. Id. judgment 3 (Buxton, L.J.).
301. 172 N.W.2d 647 (Wis. 1969).
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nuisance that injured nearby crops.30 2  The Court found it
irrelevant that the defendant exercised due care in operating the
plant.30 3 The Court refused to balance the power plant's social
and economic utility against the damage to the nearby farmers'
fields.304 Other courts have held that a "knowing" infliction of
injury constitutes intent for nuisance liability purposes. 30 5 In fact,
Missouri courts have completely abandoned investigation into
defendants' negligence or intent in nuisance suits.30 6 "Nuisance is
a condition, not an act or failure to act, and it is therefore
immaterial in determining liability to inquire whether the
defendant was negligent and what his intention, design or motive
may have been." 30 7
An action for nuisance, therefore, may provide plaintiffs
whose crops are damaged by genetically modified pollen the best
chance for recovery. A plaintiff may not need to demonstrate that
the defendant intended to allow pollen from genetically modified
crops to cross-pollinate. More importantly, courts may refuse -to
balance the genetically modified crop's social and economic utility
against its harm to the organic farmer's crops. The difficulty in
securing prospective injunctions under a nuisance theory,
however, fails to prevent the harm, and thereby provides only post
hoc compensation.
The United States' piecemeal approach to biotechnology
regulation creates a system with overlapping agency jurisdictions
and a.recovery scheme in which it is difficult for plaintiffs litigating
the common law doctrines to prevail. As a historical note,
Congress indirectly regulated water pollution through the Rivers
and Harbors Act of 1899.308 It was not until water quality in the
United States became a crisis in the early 1970s that Congress
302. See id. at 653-654.
303. See id. at 651-652.
304. See id. at 653 ("It will not be said that, because a great and socially useful
enterprise will be liable in damages, an injury small by comparison should go
unredressed.").
305. See HENDERSON, supra note 253, at 519 (citing Bradley v. American Smelting &
Refining Co., 709 P.2d 782, 785 (Wash. 1985) (adopting the Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 8A definition of intent ("'[I]ntent' is used ... to denote that the actor desires to cause
consequences of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are substantially certain
to result from it.")); see also Morgan v. Quailbrook Condo. Co., 704 P.2d 573, 576 (Utah
1985) (adopting the Restatement (Second) definition of intent).
306. See Davis v. J.C. Nichols Co., 714 S.W.2d 679, 684 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
307. Id.
308. 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-467 (1994).
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passed the Clean Water Act.30 9 The U.S. Government's failure to
enact a specific statute addressing water pollution and relying
instead on existing laws tangentially related to the actual problem,
appears strikingly similar to its approach under the Coordinated
Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology. 310 Perhaps it will
take a crisis caused by biotechnology before Congress takes direct
action to control GMOs. Furthermore, recent attempts to
internationally standardize supervisory programs and liability
schemes have met with intense U.S. opposition.311
V. INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS
Several international conventions address the liability aspects
of damage resulting from GMOs. None of these conventions are
binding on the United States or the European Union, although
some E.U. Member States are signatories. Although several
commentators acknowledge the need for unified GMO regulation
and liability standards to facilitate trade,312  international
standardization does not appear likely in the foreseeable future.
A. Council of Europe Conventions
The Council of Europe is a Pan-European organization
consisting of forty members, including all fifteen E.U. countries.
The United States is not a member. The Council is independent
of the European Union, and even if all fifteen E.U. Member
States sign Council conventions, the conventions are not legally
binding on the European Union.
309. 33 U.S.C §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
310. See Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg.
23, 302 (1986).
311. See EU Accuses U.S., Others of 'Extreme' Positions that Will Block Biosafety
Protocol, INT'L ENV'T DAILY (BNA), Feb. 16, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Bnaied File [hereinafter Extreme Positions].
312. See McGarity, supra note 1, at 437-462 (discussing the elements of an adequate
international legal regime for managing the risks posed by the deliberate release of
GMOs); see also Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International
Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039, 2097-2106 (1993) (examining the justifications for
international harmonization); Barton, supra note 39, at 113-117 (discussing the structure
and need for a biosafety protocol); Thomas P. Redick, Biotechnology, Biosafety and
Sustainable Development, 12 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 114, 114 (1997) (proposing a
voluntary management program).
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1. Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from
Activities Dangerous to the Environment
On June 21, 1993, seven members of the Council of Europe
signed the Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting
from Activities Dangerous to the Environment.313 E.U. Member
States Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Greece, and Finland
(although not an E.U. Member at the time) were original
signatories.314 Portugal signed the Convention in 1997.315 The
Convention attempts to ensure adequate compensation for victims
of environmental harm via a strict liability regime based on the
Polluter Pays Principle. 316 In addition, the Convention compels
signatories to either require individuals carry adequate liability
insurance or make payments into national compensation funds.
317
Article 2 of the Convention defines dangerous activities as
including the "production, handling, storage, use or discharge...
of genetically modified organisms." 318 Similarly, the Convention
broadly defines the scope of damage as including health, property,
impairment of the environment (including property, which forms
part of the cultural heritage and characteristic aspects of the
landscape), and the costs of preventive measures.319  The
operator, defined as the person exercising control over the
dangerous activity, 320 is liable for any damages. 321 Unfortunately,
the Convention places the liability burden on the individual
313. See Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities
Dangerous to the Environment ch. II, art. 12, June 21, 1993, Europ. T.S. No. 150, at 7
[hereinafter Civil Liability Convention]. See also Council of Europe: Seven States Sign
Civil Liability Convention, EUR. ENV'T (Brussels, Belg.), July 6, 1993, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Eurnvf File [hereinafter Seven States].
314. See Seven States, supra note 313.
315. See Council of Europe Treaty Office, Convention on Civil Liability for Damage
Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment; Chart of Signatures and
Ratifications (status as of Aug. 19, 2000)
<http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/EN/cadreprincipal.htm>.
316. See Civil Liability Convention preamble, supra note 313, at 2. See also Leonard R.
Olsen, Jr., Assessing Environmental Damage in Western Europe, GLOBAL TRADE &
TRANSP., Nov. 1994, at 40.
317. See Civil Liability Convention ch. II, art. 12, supra note 313, at 7. See also Arthur
Rogers & Jon Reeds, Environmental Insurance-Civil Liability, REUTER TEXTLINE
SURVEYOR, Mar. 25, 1993, at 6.
318. Civil Liability Convention ch. I, art. 2, supra note 313, at 3.
319. See id. ch. I, art. 7, at 4 (establishing and defining the scope of damage).
320. See id. ch. I, art. 5, at 4 (defining "operator").
321. See id. ch. II, art. 6, at 6.
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farmers, not the GMOs' developers or importers.322  The
Convention provides for joint and several liability when multiple
installations are involved, 323 but it is unclear from the text if this
includes the laboratories developing GMOs.
The Convention establishes a three-year statute of
limitations, which begins running on the date of discovery or the
date on which the damage reasonably should have been
discovered, with a maximum time period of thirty years from the
date on which the incident causing the damage occurred.324 Acts
of nature, intentional damage by third parties, and contributory
negligence are the Convention's only exemptions from liability.
325
The Council of Europe's Convention presented a
comprehensive starting point for adopting civil liability provisions
in European nations. Unfortunately, the European Union and
other multi-national organizations have failed to follow the
Council's leadership and adopt civil liability provisions
accordingly.
326
2. Convention on the Protection of the Environment Through
Criminal Law
The Council of Europe's Convention on the Protection of the
Environment Through Criminal Law327 is the first international
law to protect the environment by criminalizing pollution.328 On
November 16, 1998, seven nations signed the Convention,
including E.U. Member States Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, and Sweden.329  Austria, Belgium, and
Luxembourg signed in 1999.330 In addition to criminalizing
322. See id. (placing liability on the individual with "control" over the activity). In the
GMO context, this would place liability on the farmer exercising control over his field.
323. See id.
324. See id. ch. IV, art. 17, at 9.
325. See id. ch. II, art. 8, at 7.
326. The E.U. Commission 2000 White Paper on Environment Liability acknowledged
the Convention's value but reiterated the Commission's preference to address liability
through a comprehensive directive and not accession to the Convention. See White Paper,
supra note 59, at 25.
327. Convention on the Protection of the Environment Through Criminal Law pmbl.,
Nov. 4, 1998, EUROP. T.S. No. 172 (1998).
328. See Council of Europe Draft Calls for Use of Criminal Law to Protect
Environment, 18 INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) 500, 500 (June 28, 1995).
329. See Arthur Rogers, Seven Nations Sign Council of Europe Treaty Criminalizing
Acts Harmful to Environment, 21 INT'LENV'T REP. (BNA) 1155, 1155 (Nov. 25,1998).
330. Council of Europe Treaty Office, Convention on the Protection of the Environment
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pollution, the Convention takes a proactive approach and
punishes acts that create "a significant risk" of harming the
environment.331  Possible penalties include: prison, fines,
restoration of the environment, confiscation of profits, and
corporate liability.
332
By establishing the possibility of imprisonment for corporate
executives, criminalization aims to prevent pollution through
company business decisions. According to Council of Europe
Attorney Peter Csonka, although the issue was not discussed in
detail during the negotiations, the Convention's provisions are
"sufficiently broad" to cover GMO damage. 333  Until the
European Union harmonizes criminal law, however, this
Convention must be adopted only at the Member State level.
B. United Nations
In 1992, the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development convened in Rio de Janeiro to reaffirm the
Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment. 334 Principle 13 of the Rio Declaration,
which the United States signed, proclaims that "[s]tates shall
develop national law regarding liability and compensation for the
victims of pollution and other environmental damage." 335 With
respect to GMOs, victims in the United States do not have a
statutory basis for relief and therefore must rely upon the
common law for compensation. 336 This scheme may be unable to
satisfy Principle 13, and as discussed earlier in Part IV, may
inadequately address victims' needs.
The United Nations Industrial and Development
Organization (UNIDO) produced voluntary guidelines for the
Through Criminal Law; Chart of Signatures and Ratifications (status as of Aug. 20, 2000)
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/EN/cadreprincipal.htm>.
331. See Convention on the Protection of the Environment Through Criminal Law § II,
art. 2(1)(a)(ii), supra note 327, at . See also Rogers, supra note 329, at 1156 (quoting
Council of Europe attorney Peter Csonka ("[Tihe idea is to criminalize acts which create a
significant risk, so that the problem is tackled before damage is actually caused...")).
332. See Rogers, supra note 329, at 1156. See also Convention on the Protection of the
Environment Through Criminal Law § II, arts. 6, 7, 9, supra note 327, at 5-6.
333. Rogers, supra note 329, at 1157.
334. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, June 14, 1992, UN Doc.
A/Conf. 151/26 (vol. I) (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992).
335. Id. princ. 13, at 878.
336. See supra Part IV.B.
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release of GMOs.337 The guidelines outline a series of voluntary
reporting procedures through which users report to their
respective national governments, which, in the event of GMO
damage, then report to international organizations. 338  The
guidelines, however, are silent as to liability issues.
C. 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity/Biosafety Protocol
The Convention on Biological Diversity339 was the second
major international agreement drafted at the 1992 United Nations
conference in Rio de Janeiro. The Convention called for the
development of a Biosafety Protocol to "set international
standards for the handling of genetically engineered
organisms." 340 The European Union approved the Convention in
1993.341 Although President Clinton signed the Convention, the
Senate refused to ratify it.342 In January 2000, after five years of
negotiating, the parties to the Convention, and observers such as
the United States, agreed to the Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety.34
3
Several liability and compensation issues were at the center
of U.S. efforts to dismantle the Protocol, including (1) requiring
that either export or import companies be bonded, (2) establishing
an international liability fund, and (3) fixing liability on either
importing or exporting countries. 344 As the largest producer of
genetically modified products, the United States lobbied for
bonding import companies and fixing liability on the importing,
not the exporting, country.345 Additionally, the United States
337. See U.N. Industrial and Developmental Organization, Voluntary Code of Conduct
for the Release of Organisms into the Environment (visited Nov. 24, 1999)
<http://www.binas.unido.org/binas/Regulations/unido/codes.html>.
338. See id. § II-C-1, princ. 6.
339. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Convention on
Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992).
340. See id. art. 19, at 830. See also Cheryl Hogue, Debate at Biosafety Protocol Talks
to Center on Advance Agreement Regime, 21 INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) 807, 807 (Aug. 19,
1998).
341. Council Decision 93/626 of October 25, 1993 Concerning the Conclusion of the
Convention of Biological Diversity, 1993 O.J. (L 309) 1.
342. See Hogue, supra note 340, at 808.
343. See Convention on Biological Diversity, Global Treaty Adopted on Genetically
Modified Organisms (Jan. 29. 2000) <http://www.biodiv.org/press/pr-2000-01-28-
biosafety.html>.
344. See Hogue, supra note 341, at 808.
345. See Extreme Positions, supra note 311.
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opposed the establishment of an international liability fund. 346
Finally, the United States favored eliminating all agricultural
commodities from the scope of the Protocol.347 The European
Commission labeled the United States' position on agricultural
commodities as "extreme" because it effectively excluded ninety-
nine percent of the GMOs the Protocol supposedly covered.
348
Furthermore, the Europe Union criticized the United States for
attempting to place "all responsibility when it comes to liability on
the country to which a particular genetically modified crop will be
exported."
349
The compromised Protocol to which the United States finally
agreed failed to resolve the liability issues. The Protocol merely
requires that GMO exporters, through "Advanced Informed
Agreement Procedures," 350 ensure that recipient countries have
the opportunity and capacity to assess the technology's risks prior
to its importation.
VI. PROPOSED CHANGES IN E.U. LAW TO ENSURE LIABILITY FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE
Proposed changes to Directive 90/220 and a proposed new
directive on civil liability may include provisions establishing
liability for damage resulting from GMOs within the European
Union. Each proposal adopts the Polluter Pays Principle, which
places the financial burden on GMO users, and not on a national
or E.U.-wide compensation scheme. Elements of each proposal
also invoke the use of the Precautionary Principle. In addition,
the recently revised Products Liability Directive may provide an
alternate means to address some damage GMOs cause, although it
may not necessarily address environmental damage.
A. Modification of Directive 90/220
In February 1998, the European Commission proposed
extensive revisions to Directive 90/220 on the issue of deliberate
release of GMOs into the environment.351 The impetus for the
346. See id.
347. See id.
348. See id.
349. Id.
350. See Protocol on Biosafety art. 19, pt. 3, supra note 343, at 830.
351. See generally Commission Proposal, supra note 36.
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Commission's revisions was to simplify and accelerate the
approval process.352 The European Parliament, acting through
the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer
Protection, rejected the Commission's proposal and instead
adopted several substantive amendments.
353
The European Parliament may be taking an especially firm
stance against the revisions because of the passage of revised
Directive 90/219 on the contained use of GMOs'. 354 Under
cooperation procedures with the Council, Parliament could
propose amendments but could not block the legislation.
355
Current proposals to revise Directive 90/220 fall under the
harmonization procedures of Article 95 (formerly Article 100a),
which provides Parliament with a veto power.356  Many of
Parliament's concerns that Directive 90/219 failed to address were
added as amendments to Directive 90/220.
The most controversial amendment Parliament proposed
involves imposing full civil and criminal liability for any damage to
health or the environment caused by a GMO release.357 The
Commission's revised proposal, submitted March 25, 1999, does
not include Parliament's amendments establishing liability.358 The
Commission firmly opposes including liability provisions in the
GMO Directive, preferring instead to generally address liability in
a separate directive, 359 for which Parliament has been waiting
since 1996.360 In addition to facing civil and criminal liability, the
parliamentary amendments also require each entity to have
352. See Parliament Resolution recital 12 (amend. 6), supra note 35.
353. See generally id.
354. See Directive 98/81 of 26 October 1998 Amending Directive 90/219 on the
Contained Use of Genetically Modified Micro-organisms, 1998 O.J. (L 330) 13.
355. See Biotech Industry Should Bear Full Responsibility for Accidental "Escapes" of
GMOs, INT'L ENV'T DAILY (BNA), June 18, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Bnaied File [hereinafter Full Responsibility]. For a discussion of the various legislative
procedures between the Commission, Parliament, and Council, see supra notes 86-96 and
accompanying text.
356. See TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION art. 189b (co-decision procedures).
357. See Parliament Resolution art. 1(12) (amend. 95), supra note 35.
358. See Amended Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive
Amending Directive 90/220/EEC on the Deliberate Release into the Environment of
Genetically Modified Organisms, Mar. 26, 1999, O.J. (C 139) 7 (1999).
359. See Full Responsibility, supra note 355. See also White Paper, supra note 59, at 26.
360. See Commission's Long-Awaited Communication on Civil Liability Expected in
Coming Months, 19 INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) 723, 723 (Aug. 21, 1996) [hereinafter Long-
Awaited Report].
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sufficient liability insurance to cover any potential losses. 361 Given
the intense political climate surrounding GMO safety, Parliament
may veto any revision of Directive 90/220 rather than sacrifice its
proposed liability and insurance amendments.
B. Proposed Directive on Civil Liability for Environmental
Damage
In 1994, the Commission first proposed a comprehensive
directive establishing civil liability for damage to the
environment.362 The 1994 proposal identified four reasons for
Community action: (1) to recognize public demand for systems of
accountability; (2) pledge to take action; (3) establish uniform
liability for environmental damage throughout the Community;
and (4) eliminate distortions in competition resulting from
differing civil liability systems. 363  In addition to these four
reasons, there is a danger that environmental liability will be
implemented in a piecemeal fashion through product-specific
GMO and products liability directives. The initial 1993 proposal
included the civil law tradition of enforcing the principle that a
person should rectify damage that he or she causes 364 -this
concept is in line with the general Polluter Pays Principle, which
the European Union adopted in the TEU.
365
In February 2000, the Commission issued a White Paper on
Environmental Liability, 366 which proposes a liability regime
implementing the Polluter Pays Principle. 367 Strict liability would
apply for all damage to health, property, and the environment
caused by activities the European Community designates as
"dangerous" 368 and traditional fault-based liability would apply
for environmental damage caused by non-dangerous activities.
369
In addition, the Commission recommended liability not apply
361. See Parliament Resolution art. 1(12) (amend. 95), supra note 35.
362. See Civil Liability Green Paper, supra note 58.
363. See id. pt. 2.
364. See id. pt. 1.4.
365. See TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION art. 130r(2) (adopting the Polluter Pays
Principle).
366. See White Paper, supra note 59.
367. See id. at 11-13.
368. See id. at 31.
369. See id. For a thorough discussion of the benefits of a strict liability regime for
dangerous goods and a fault-based regime for non-dangerous goods, see Lucas Bergkamp,
A Future Environmental Liability Regime, 7 EUR. ENvTL. L. REV. 200 (1998).
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retroactively. 370  Finally, the Commission recommended
legislation allowing interests groups to take action against either
the state or the polluter to restore the environment. 371 Despite
the issuance of the White Paper, the Commission has not yet
indicated when it will actually submit proposed legislation to the
Council and Parliament.
C. Products Liability Directive
Recent revisions to the Products Liability Directive
specifically include primary agricultural products.372  "The
producer of any raw material" 373 and "any person who imports
into the Community a product ... in the course of his business"
374
is subject to liability. Liability for any defective product
containing a GMO is therefore traced to the farmer-producer.
Austria has recently come under the Commission's fire for
exempting farmers from the scope of the Products Liability
Directive. 375 The Commission objected to Austria's amendment
of the Directive by adding other exemptions.376 It is unclear
whether Austria will appeal the decision to the European Court of
Justice or amend its national legislation.
377
Under the Products Liability Directive, an injured person
must prove actual damage, such as personal injury or damage to
property.378 This injury definition may exclude purely economic
damage, such as the organic farmer's lost profits due to cross-
pollinated crops and ownerless environmental damage. A
claimant must also establish the existence of a defect in the
product itself.379 Member States, however, could pass legislation
deeming a GMO defective in the event it causes damage.
380
370. See White Paper, supra note 59, at 16.
371. See id. at 22-23.
372. See Directive 99/34 pt. 6, supra note 57, at 20.
373. Council Directive on the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations and
Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning Liability for Defective
Products No. 85/374, art. 3(1), July, 25, 1985 O.J. (L 210) 29, 31 (1985) [hereinafter
Directive 85/374].
374. Id. art. 3(2), at 31.
375. See Austrian GM Liability Exemption Challenged, AGRA EUR. (London), July 30,
1999, at EP/8, available in LEXIS, News Library, Asapii File.
376. See Directive 85/374 art. 3(2), supra note 373, at 31.
377. See id.
378. See id. art. 9, at 31.
379. See id. art. 4, at 31.
380. See Nion, supra note 184, at 327.
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Finally, an injured person must prove the existence of a causal
relationship between the defect and the damage. 381  Genetic
markers placed inside GMOs could greatly aid in establishing
causation. Potentially liable parties may invoke a "state-of-the-art
defense," as long as "the state of scientific or technical knowledge
at the time when he put the product into circulation was not such
as to enable the existence of the defect to be discovered."
382
Although the Products Liability Directive is a potentially
useful liability scheme for injured plaintiffs, it fails to provide
adequate relief for farmers whose crops are cross-pollinated by
genetically modified pollen. Defendants probably could not avail
themselves to the state-of-the-art defense because scientific
studies document the risks of cross-pollination. Even seed
companies recommend planting buffer zones around genetically
modified fields. The Directive's critical flaw lies in its damage
definition, which only includes economic injury or injury to
property not intended for private use or consumption.
383
Therefore, individuals harmed by cross-pollination probably could
not recover under a products liability theory.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although several factors influence the final results, it is
predictable that pressure from within the European Union to
reach a common position, coupled with outside pressure to limit
trade distortions, will force the European Union to pass legislation
containing GMO liability provisions in the near future. Professor
Michel Petit identified four primary political and economic forces
shaping E.U. agricultural policy: (1) pressure to reach a common
decision; (2) the need to accommodate budget constraints; (3) the
downward rigidity of price supports; and (4) outside pressures to
limit trade distortions. 384 With respect to the European Union's
GMO policy, only the first and fourth factors appear relevant-
the budget constraints and price supports are not implicated.
381. See Directive 85/374 art. 4, supra note 373, at 31.
382. Id. art. 7(e), at 31.
383. See id. art. 9, at 31 (providing the Directive's definition of damage).
384. See MICHEL PETIT, THE WORLD BANK, PRESSURES ON, AND TRENDS IN, THE
EVOLUTION OF THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY: IMPACT OF WTO
COMMITMENTS 1 (1998).
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
Revision of Directive 90/220 is subject to extensive outside
pressure, specifically from the United States and the WTO.385
U.S. corporations are eager to export their biotechnology
advances. U.S. farmers, searching for additional markets in a
period of historically low commodity prices, anxiously await the
revised directive and subsequent product approvals. The recent
WTO decisions holding in favor of the United States with respect
to trade disputes over bananas and hormone-fed beef established
precedents against the European Union's attempts to impose non-
science based trade barriers. 386 Revision of the GMO directive
may forestall formal WTO complaints about the European
Union's inconsistent approval process. Parliament's
disappointment with the revisions of Directive 90/219 and the
absence of a civil liability directive addressing environmental
damage may provide the necessary impetus for Parliament to
continue blocking attempts to revise Directive 90/220 until its
demands are met. Therefore, if the Council and Parliament agree
to a revised GMO directive's terms this year, it probably will
contain liability provisions.
In the absence of a GMO directive, the revised Products
Liability Directive may adequately cover damage defective GMOs
cause to health and personal property. Member States could
increase the liability scheme's effectiveness by implementing a
presumption of defect in the event of GMO-caused damage. 387
Although environmental and economic damage will be
unrecoverable, the Directive's strict liability provisions will benefit
plaintiffs in the Member States that have no existing liability
schemes. International agreements, such as the Council of
Europe's Convention or the Biosafety Protocol, may push
Member States to adopt liability legislation independent of the
European Union. Without additional legislation establishing a
comprehensive liability scheme directly addressing GMOs (like
Austria's), plaintiffs in common law countries, such as the United
385. See U.S. Considers Filing Complaint with WTO over EU Barriers to GMO Imports,
Aide Says, 22 INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) 569, 569 (July 7, 1999); Aaron Statement, supra
note 43; Eizenstat, supra note 45.
386. See UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2000 NATIONAL TRADE
ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 90, 95, available at (visited Aug. 26,
2000) <http://www.ustr.gov/reports/nte/200O/nte20O0.pdf>.
387. Cf supra text accompanying note 197 (explaining German laws' use of the defect
presumption with regard to GMO-caused damage).
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States and the United Kingdom, as well as in civil law countries,
such as Germany, will only recover damages if they meet very
difficult standards of proof. Furthermore, liability would be
imposed on individual farmers and not biotechnology companies,
which are more likely able to afford the costs of such an
imposition than are farmers.
An E.U. Directive modeled on the U.K. proposed Simpson
Bill may be the optimal solution. Under such a model, plaintiffs
would enjoy the benefits of a strict liability recovery regime and
mandatory insurance for satisfying damage awards. Damage to
the environment, as well as purely economic damage, would fall
within the Directive's purview. Liability payments could be
capped at a level sufficient to cover most damages, as they are in
Austria and Germany, thereby providing the biotechnology
industry with a degree of certainty. Finally, under a Simpson-type
Directive, consent holders, and not individual farmers, would be
liable for damage caused by the deliberate release of GMOs.
General tort theories, such as negligence, could apply in rare cases
wherein farmers or individual users fail to properly use the
valuable, yet possibly risky, GMO technology.

